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DAMAGE SUITS AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS
RONALD A. CASS t
I. INTRODUCTION: TANGLED THREADS
Increasingly over the past twenty years, government officials
have been sued for monetary damages.' An array of asserted in-
juries (physical, financial, and emotional) attributed to a variety
of legal wrongs (common law torts, violations of statutory restric-
tions on government action, and infringement of constitutional
guarantees) by officials of all types (the President of the United
States, Cabinet officers, governors, judges, prosecutors, prison
wardens, school superintendents, teachers, and police officers) has
confronted courts. Often without benefit of explicit legislative
attention to this question, courts have been asked to determine
the occasions for holding public officials answerable in damages.
Under the Supreme Court's active leadership, the tests for determin-
ing when officials will be excused from liability have been altered
substantially.2 The formerly disparate rules for officials of various
ranks and for differing claimed wrongs have been abandoned: in
their place, a general rule has been fashioned for nearly all non-
judicial government employees, 3 granting "qualified immunity"
if the official acted in good faith and if there were reasonable
grounds for assuming that the acts were authorized by law.
4
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fessor Cass will be an Associate Professor of Law at Boston University.
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draft: Michael P. Dooley, Frank H. Easterbrook, Clayton P. Gillette, James A.
Henderson, Jr., Harvey S. Perlman, Glen 0. Robinson, George A. Rutherglen,
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Robert E. Scott, and the participants in workshops at
Boston University School of Law, Emory University School of Law, and the Uni-
versity of Miami School of Law. I also am grateful for the financial support of
the University of Virginia Law School Foundation and the University of Vir-
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' See, e.g., ADMISTRATrvE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1979
ANNUAL REPORT OF T=E DmEcTOR Table 21, at 61 (tabulating prisoner petitions
filed in federal district courts during the 1970s).
2 See text accompanying notes 69-106 infra.
a Legislators and members of their staffs acting in a strictly legislative ca-
pacity are excepted from this general rule, retaining instead absolute immunity
for such acts pursuant to the speech or debate clause of the Constitution, U.S.
CoNsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("for any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Sena-
tors and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place"), or similar
provisions in state constitutions. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306,
312-13 (1973); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-75 (1951).
4 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506-07 (1978); Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1978); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
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The change in the defense officials enjoy to actions for damage
liability can be traced through the case law without great difficulty,
but it must be understood against a background that the cases,
without much explicit discussion, reflect. Legal doctrine and com-
mentary that can be sorted out under five different headings come
together in the official liability cases: (1) the basis for tort lia-
bility; (2) the function of government; (3) the relation of federal
to state government; (4) the role of courts, and (5) the relation-
ship among members of an enterprise. These are the threads from
which the fabric of official liability decisions is woven. Changes
in each of these areas have had an impact on the scope of official
damage liability. Although a full explication of the interplay of
these areas would require considerably lengthier treatment than is
appropriate to this format, some sense of their importance to dis-
cussion of official liability can be given in relatively short compass.
Notions respecting the basis for tort liability inform discus-
sions of officials' excuse from liability in two ways. First, tort lia-
bility or federal analogues to tort liability must (at least arguably)
attach to official conduct before the question of excuse arises. The
breadth or narrowness of tort liability in general, therefore, is
the initial determinant of the scope of officials' liability. Second,
the principles that inform discussion of tort liability-its usefulness
to accomplish goals of fairness or of socially efficient allocation of
resources-provide a set of tools well-suited to discussion of the
desirability of official liability.
Both the scope of substantive tort liability and the principles
advanced to aid analysis of tort liability have undergone a meta-
morphosis that has affected official liability. The decisions respect-
ing official liability over the past 150 years reveal a slowly developing
pattern of official excuse over roughly the first 100 years of that
period and a less gradual process of dissatisfaction with, and altera-
tion of, that pattern over the next half-century, with most of the
actual change concentrated in the last two decades. 5 The change
in tort law and commentary fits the same general pattern, but it
occurs a bit earlier, presaging the change in official liability. Thus,
the evolution through the latter half of the nineteenth century of a
predominantly fault-based system of tort liability-requiring a show-
ing that harm resulted from defendant's negligence or from acts
taken by defendant with the intent to harm plaintiff-was followed
577 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). See also text accompanying notes 69-106
infra.
5 See text accompanying notes 36-106 infra.
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by recognition of tort liability without overt inquiry as to fault in
several broad areas.6 So, too, commentary on principles of tort
law shifted from discussion of personal culpability 7 to discussion
concerning the social impact of liability rules,8 a theme that has
come to dominate tort writing despite the dissenting notes sounded
by Professors Epstein and Fletcher.9 Although fairness and dis-
tributional goals may nonetheless be pursued,10 the common
ground for examination of a tort rule now is its effect on indi-
viduals' behavior. Increasingly, the mediating effect of systemic
costs (the costs of formulating and applying rules) and of what might
be termed "negative" liability avoidance measures " (encompassing
devices, such as insurance, that spread risk and those, like "defensive
medicine," that shift the burden of reducing risk) is recognized
as an important factor in determining a liability rule's impact on
behavior.
12
The function performed by government also has changed over
this period, and the courts' evaluation of the appropriate justifi-
cations for, and limitations on, government action have changed
along with it. It is a commonplace that government activity has
greatly expanded over the last fifty years. The number of gov-
ernment employees, the number and range of government actions,
6 Liability for defective products is an example. See, e.g., Prosser, The Fall
of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MNN. L. REv. 791 (1966);
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960). The argument advanced in Gregory, Trespass to Negligence
to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359 (1951), is that the absolute liability
decisions represent not so much an evolutionary change in tort law as a recog-
nition of alternatives to fault-based liability that always have existed in Anglo-
American tort law.
7 E.g., 0. HOLMES, TBE COMMON LAW 77-129 (1881).
S E.g., G. CAr.mnsIs, THE CosTs oF Accmxrrs (1970); Henderson, Extend-
ing the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of
the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1036 (1980); Posner, A Theory of Negli-
gence, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 29 (1972).
9 See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL S=tu. 151 (1973);
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HtAv. L. REv. 537 (1972).
10 See G. CALAB E ,s supra note 8; Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L.
PrEv. 1089, 1098-101 (1972). See also W. BLum & H. KALvEN, Ptr.ac LAw
PERSPECTIVES ON A PI-VATE LAW PROBLEM (1965) (merging deterrence and fair-
ness analyses).
1"Positive" liability avoidance measures would be socially desirable means
of reducing the harm to which liability attaches. "Negative" liability avoidance
measures include all other means of reducing the likely costs of liability suits to
the putative defendant.
12E.g., G. CALAnsREsr, supra note 8, at 250-65; R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNELL,
BAsic PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFIC VICm (1965); Franklin, Replacing the Negli-
gence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774
(1967).
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the money absorbed by government, and the proportion of the work-
force and of the national product devoted to government all have
increased remarkably over this period.' 3 The rise in government
activity means that, regardless of the benefit conferred by govern-
mental actors, there is increased likelihood of complaint that these
actors have harmed others; hence, perhaps, there is increased pres-
sure to provide recompense for officially inflicted injuries. With
a few notable exceptions, government activity in this same period
has won a presumption of validity that at least for a time it lacked.
The constraints on both federal and state governmental programs
imposed in the early 1800s to prevent government trespass on
vested rights in property, and in the late 1800s and early 1900s
to prevent interference with individuals' "right to contract," largely
failed to survive the 1930s.14 A general presumption that govern-
ment at some level, if not at all levels, may regulate almost any
sphere of human endeavor, and may do so by almost any means,
has replaced the restrictive view of the role of government reflected
in cases as various as Lochner v. New York, 15 Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States,16 and Meyer v. Nebraska.'7 If legal doc-
23 See, e.g., SENATE Commsi. o-r GOVEmNmENTAL AFFAis, OECANZATION OF
FED EAL E-XcutnVE DEPARTmENTS AND AGENCIES, 95th Cong., ist Sess. (1977)
(charts showing change in federal employment); The 1981 Budget and Regulatory
Reform, 4 REG. 7 (Mar./Apr. 1980).
14 Compare New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Adkins
v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819) and Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) with
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 101 S. Ct. 453 (1980); North Dakota
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973); Rail-
way Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) and Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934).
5 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding a state regulation of hours worked by bakery
employees to be an unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom to contract pro-
tected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
Other attempts to regulate working conditions were struck down as beyond
congressional power over commerce, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918), and as outside the scope of federal taxing authority, e.g., Child Labor
Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
16295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933
to be an unconstitutional extension of the federal commerce power to matters
not directly related to interstate commerce and also declaring the Act an uncon-
stitutional delegation of congressional authority).
17262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding a state law that prohibited teaching a foreign
language to young children to be an unconstitutional interference with the liberty
of teachers to pursue their professions, of children to learn, and of parents to
guide their children's education, all protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
Meyer may be viewed as the forerunner of more recent cases that limit gov-
ernment power to interfere with what often are termed "individual rights." The
opinion well could have been framed in first amendment, rather than freedom
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trine accepted some relatively clear principle by which to delimit
the appropriate sphere for government activity, official defenses to
liability might be fashioned to permit reasonably free rein for
activity within that sphere and to discourage other activity.18
The relation of federal to state government has undergone a
similarly dramatic transformation over the past fifty years. The
retreat from doctrines severely limiting the role of the federal gov-
ernment has been coupled with development of significant federal
control over state activity. At the practical level, expanded federal
operation, with its greater ability to spread costs and to shift them
to persons outside a smaller political jurisdiction, has made state
and local governments increasingly dependent on the federal gov-
ernment's decisions respecting the collection and distribution of
funds.19 At the same time, legal doctrines have enhanced federal
control over state functions not tied to federal funds. The statutes
giving rise to the provision now simply referenced as section 1983
were enacted in the mid-1800s. 20 They had little effect, however,
until the Supreme Court began applying the restrictions contained
in the Bill of Rights to the states, through the doctrine of incor-
of contract, terms, making liberty of thought and speech the critical values
protected. Those were not, however, the terms in which Meyer was cast. Al-
though students of constitutional law today must grapple with "free speech" cases
that may look like Meyer and with "substantive due process" cases (e.g., Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its progeny) that are close relatives of
Lochner, see note 15 supra, the earlier cases evince a belief that government
should be limited to performing only a relatively few functions; the more recent
cases, on the other hand, concede a wide range of functions to be legitimate sub-
jects of governmental action, but subject such action to judicial scrutiny in order
to protect interests not "adequately" safeguarded by the other branches. See text
accompanying notes 23-25 infra.
18 There is at least a plausible argument that some of the older cases in which
official defenses to liability were rejected are explicable as attempts to vindicate
certain basic limitations on government action. See the discussion of Miller v.
Horton, notes 57-59 infra & accompanying text, in which tangible property was
physically harmed without compensation and without satisfaction of the narrow
rules allowing government interference with property.
19 See, e.g., Revenue Sharing with the States: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the City of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 311-72 (1979) (report by Congressional Research Service en-
titled "General Revenue Sharing and Alternatives: Economic Rationales Past and
Present"); General Revenue Sharing-The Issues Before Us: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979); Muller & Fix, Federal Solicitude, Local
Costs: The Impact of Federal Regulation on Municipal Finances, 4 RE. 29 (Jul./
Aug. 1980).
2042 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) codifies a provision enacted in the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. Related provisions
were derived from the Civil Bights Act of 1866, Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1,
14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1976)), and the Civil Rights
Act of 1870, Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)). See note 263 infra for the text of § 1983.
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poration into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, and
expanding the protection afforded by the equal protection clause.21
As the substantive protections of federal law against state action
have expanded, so has the ambit of potential official liability under
section 1983. And as potential liability has expanded, section
1983 damage suits often have provided occasion for dispute over
the proper roles of federal and state law in policing official actions
that may be at once tortious and constitutionally proscribed.
22
Official liability cases quite plainly implicate some notion of
the role courts should play in our system of government. Decision
whether a government officer should be liable in damages for acts
arguably performed in his official capacity necessarily involves a
choice respecting judicial roles. A broad rule of official excuse from
liability could be justified by notions that the judiciary should per-
form only a limited role in governance and that questions con-
cerning the propriety of officials' acts are appropriately handled
by deference to other branches of government.23 Narrow rules of
official excuse, in contrast, may be premised on views that courts
should review a wide range of decisions by other branches and
need worry but little that they might be intruding in areas better
left to coordinate branches.24 While there does not appear to be a
consensus among legal scholars on the role courts should play, there
does appear to be a consensus that over the last two or three decades
courts have played a relatively active role in overseeing the opera-
tions of other government branches-witness the increased use of
broad injunctive remedies to supervise operation of schools, prisons,
and other government institutions.
25
23 These are principally developments occurring from the 1930s to the 1960s.
See generally G. GuNT=E, CASES AND MATEALS ON CONSTrTrTaONAL LAW 476-
971 (10th ed. 1980) (collecting materials).
22 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
23 See generally A. BicEEL, Tim LrAsT DANcGEOUS BRANcH (1962); J. ELY,
D~mOCnscy AND Dm-us'r (1980); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Con-
stitutional Law, 73 HAIv. L. 1Ev. 1 (1959). See note 24 infra.
24 See generally Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms
of Justice, 93 HAzy. L. REv. 1 (1979); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive
Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLmrM.
L. REv. 1 (1964); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980). Each of the authors cited in this note and
in note 23 supra argue for "principled" judicial decisionmaking. They differ sig-
nificantly, however, on the source of the principles and on the extent to which
the interests protected by courts should overcome those protected by the political
branches.
25 See, e.g., 0. Fiss, THm Crvm r-x-rrs INjuNcnoN passim (1978); Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1976);
Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litiga-
tion, 93 HAav. L. 1,Ev. 465 (1980); Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126
U. PA. L. 1Ev. 715 (1978).
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Finally, decisions respecting official liability call into play ideas
about the nature of joint or multiperson enterprises. Officials
invariably are part of some governmental entity. The way in
which the various components of that entity relate one to another
has important implications for assessing the necessity and the utility
of an "external" check over the actions of one component-part.
Government officials, thus, are akin to corporate officers and em-
ployees. The manner in which an organization, whether govern-
mental or private enterprise, structures an employee's incentives
will, as a general matter, allow prediction of the employee's be-
havior absent liability and of the manner in which the employee
will respond to the threat of liability. The notion that stock own-
ership in publicly held corporations did not give stockholders effec-
tive control over the behavior of corporate employees was instru-
mental in the expansion over the last fifty years of the legal remedies
stockholders enjoy to challenge or to gain recompense for corporate
acts with which they disagree. 26  The perceived absence of other
control mechanisms mandated provision of some legal remedy for
dissenting stockholders. Recent writings indicating that a variety
of relatively effective control mechanisms operates to harmonize
managers' and stockholders' interests 27 have prompted calls for
relaxation or elimination of some legal constraints on managerial
conduct.
28
26 See, e.g., Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Singer
v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
27E.g., Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcoN.
288 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FiNAcrAI EcoN. 305 (1976). Jensen and
Meckling divide the various mechanisms for promoting increases in the joint
product of firm members into two groups. One group consists of actions taken
by someone who might be thought of as a "principal" to insure greater fidelity to
his aims by one who might be viewed as his "agent." The other group of ac-
tions, termed "bonding costs," are those undertaken by the agent to demonstrate
greater probability of fidelity to the principal's purposes. Jensen & Meckling,
supra, at 308-10. Fama extends this analysis, arguing that the range of mecha-
nisms for securing maximum joint product leaves each participant in a firm with
some opportunities for self-interested action at the expense of joint product and,
at least in a competitive environment for production and consumption of what the
participants have to offer (money, managerial skill, etc.), considerable constraints
(discipline) on the ability of any participant to take advantage of those opportuni-
ties. Given the reciprocal nature of the opportunity-discipline construct, Fama
believes traditional principal-agent analysis to be misleading. Fama, supra. A
good general treatment of both the problems of conflicting interests in joint enter-
prises and some means for harmonizing them is K. Anuow, Tim Lnvrrs oF OR-
cANrZATION (1974). An application of similar analysis in the context of govern-
ment decisioumaking is J. GREEN & J. LAFFoNT, INCENT~vcs IN PtaLIc
DEcIsioN-MAx G (1979).
28 See, e.g., Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L.
1Ev. 1 (1980).
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Scholarly writings on official liability have begun to recognize
the significance of these five threads running through the judicial
decisions. 29 This article does not attempt a comprehensive in-
tegration of these areas into analysis of official liability but rather
focuses on the first and last areas: the implications of tort principles
and of the relations among members of an enterprise to official
liability. Objections that all levels of government have engaged in
activity ill-suited to the type of collective and coercive decision-
making characteristic of government, that the federal government
has improperly interfered with matters better left to state or local
control, and that the courts have unduly expanded the ambit of
substantive protections against government action will not be
addressed, although concerns in each area undoubtedly have affected
case development and can provide the basis for critiques of official
liability decisions. Further, the connection between official excuse
from liability and the proper underlying standard of tort liability,
explored previously by Professor Epstein,30 is not pursued here, in
part because Epstein is correct that, by and large, the basic liability
analysis and the official excuse analysis will cover the same ground.
Instead, this article builds on four prior efforts to relate liability
principles and organizational concerns to official liability. Pro-
fessor Mashaw has illustrated the importance of focusing on the
incentive effects of liability rules.31 Professor Shepsle has demon-
29 See Baxter, Enterprise Liability, Public and Private, 42 LAW & Co'rxzmp.
PaOB. 45 (Winter 1978); Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort
Liability, 77 COLUm. L. REv. 1175 (1977); Boyer, Civil Liability for Prejudicial
Pre-Trial Statements by Prosecutors, 15 Azc. Cnmi. L. REv. 231 (1978); Davis,
An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 Tmx. L. REv. 703 (1974);
Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44
U. CoLo. L. REv. 1 (1972); Epstein, Private-Law Models for Official Immunity,
42 LAw & CoNTmEM. PRom. 53 (Winter 1978); Freed, Executive Official Im-
munity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U.L.
REv. 526 (1977); Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional
Rights, 67 CALxn. L. REv. 1242 (1979); Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government
Officers: Property Rights and Official Accountability, 42 LAw & CornEM. PROB.
8 (Winter 1978); Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the
Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J.
447 (1978); Olson, Official Liability and its Less Legalistic Alternatives, 42
LAw & CoNT-mp. POB. 67 (Winter 1978); Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The
Doctrine of Judicial Impunity, 64 VA. L. REv. 833 (1978); Shepsle, Official Er-
rors and Official Liability, 42 LAw & CoueMP. POB. 35 (Winter 1978); Whit-
man, Constitutional Torts, 79 MicH. L. REv. 5 (1980); Yudof, Liability for Con-
stitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official, 49 S. CAL. L. REv.
1322 (1976).
30 Epstein, supra note 29.
31 Mashaw, supra note 29. Mashaw also identified the personal gain to
officials that would result if, through a grant of immunity, they enjoyed a "property
right" to err in performing their assigned tasks. This point received earlier elabora-
tion in a different context in McKean, Property Rights Within Government, and
Devices to Increase Governmental Efficiency, 39 S. Ecox. J. 177 (1972).
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strated some difficulties of using liability rules to prevent official
errors given the different sorts of injuries such errors produce.82
Professor Olson has observed the special difficulty of defining and
correcting official errors, owing to the nature of a bureaucracy
engaged in producing "public goods." 33 Professor Baxter has dis-
cussed the utility of enterprise liability in other contexts to correct
errors by employees of a profit-making "bureaucracy," although
noting the possibility that governmental bureaucracies do not need
or will not similarly respond to liability for employee errors.34
This article integrates these insights into an analysis of the appropri-
ate scope of personal damage liability for government officers.
Part II of the article traces the movement from a two-tiered
system of official excuse from liability to a uniform "qualified im-
munity" for all officers who are said to perform neither judicial
nor legislative tasks. Part III explains the case development on
the basis of tort principles concerned with shaping individual be-
havior. Several categories of official activity are identified, each
distinguished from the others by the nature of the nonliability
incentives that constrain its performance. These categories might
very roughly approximate the different classes of officials identified
by the Supreme Court, although the fit is far from perfect. Under
a limiting assumption about the liability avoidance measures gen-
erated by its decisions, the Supreme Court's official liability deci-
sions can be justified as beneficial efforts to shape official behavior
at tolerable systemic cost. Granting the assumption, the Court
generally has provided a broad excuse from liability to officials who
have strong incentives to act in a socially desirable manner and
whose actions can be reviewed only at high systemic cost, while
conferring a narrower excuse from liability to officials who have
weak incentives to act in a socially desirable fashion and whose con-
duct can be reviewed at relatively low systemic cost. Part IV relaxes
the assumption about liability avoidance measures and explores the
impact of liability on individual activity given different possible
relations among members of the individual's employing enterprise.
The effect of the Supreme Court's decisions is questionable once
the limiting assumption is abandoned. Part V explores possible
differences between placing liability on officials and placing it on
the employing enterprise, suggesting that under certain conditions
the latter course might be preferable.
32 Shepsle, supra note 29.
33 Olson, supra note 29.
34 Baxter, supra note 29.
PUBLIC OFFICERS
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY STANDARD
This part of the article sketches the history of government
officers' personal damage liability, which I refer to as official lia-
bility, as developed by federal and state courts. The discussion
focuses on Supreme Court decisionmaking. State courts, as well as
lower federal courts, generally have followed the Supreme Court's
lead in this area.3 5
A. The Traditional Pattern
Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, American officials
could be divided, for purposes of describing liability for their offi-
cial actions, into two categories. Officials in the first group were
immunized broadly from liability. Officials in the second group
depended on particularized privileges to defend against damage
actions. The central figures in the first group were judges sitting
in courts of general jurisdiction. 6 Even allegations that a judge
acted maliciously were insufficient to remove his immunity to
damage liability for actions done in his judicial capacity.37 Legis-
lators, too, were held immune from liability.3  At the federal
level, this immunity was premised on the speech or debate clause
of the Constitution, although the protection extended beyond the
literal confines of that clause.39 As with judges, inquiry into a
legislator's motives was barred.40 The final members of this group
of officials were high-ranking executive officers.41  The clearest
35 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Ross Township, 82 Mich. App. 77, 266 N.W.2d
674 (1978); Tyler v. Whitehead, 583 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Centen-
nial Land & Dev. Co. v. Township of Medford, 165 N.J. Super. 220, 397 A.2d
1136 (1979); Neiswender v. Edinger, 59 Ohio App. 2d 25, 392 N.E.2d 580
(1978); Ferri v. Rosetti, 483 Pa. 327, 396 A.2d 1193 (1979).
36See 2 T. COOLxY, LAw or TORTS §§ 299, 312 (4th ed. 1932); Jennings,
Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 Mnm. L. B-v. 263, 270-74 & n.29
(1937) (citing cases). The historical roots of this immunity are discussed in
Becht, The Absolute Privilege of the Executive in Defamation, 15 V,.m. L. REv.
1127, 1135-36 (1962), and Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CALIF.
L. REv. 303, 307-16 (1959).
37W . Paossmn, THE LAw OF TOnTS § 132, at 987-88 (4th ed. 1971); Jennings,
supra note 36, at 270-73; see Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871);
Anderson v. Park, 57 Iowa 69, 71-72, 10 N.W. 310, 311 (1881).
38 E.g., Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
39 Id. See note 3 supra. See also Engdahl, supra note 29, at 42.
4o See W. PsossEn, supra note 37, § 132, at 988; Gray, supra note 36, at
318-22.
41 See W. Pnossmi, supra note 37, § 132, at 988; Becht, supra note 36, at
1136-37; Freed, supra note 29, at 530. As noted by Professor Freed, id. 528
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statement of executive immunity is the Supreme Court's 1896
decision in Spalding v. Vilas, 42 holding the Postmaster General im-
mune from liability for advising the plaintiff's clients that they
had no obligation to pay their attorney any part of certain awards
from the Post Office Department.43
We are of the opinion that the same general considera-
tions of public policy and convenience which demand for
judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity from
civil suits for damages arising from acts done by them in
the course of the performance of their judicial functions,
apply to a large extent to official communications made by
heads of Executive Departments when engaged in the dis-
charge of duties imposed upon them by law .... In ex-
ercising the functions of his office, the head of an Execu-
tive Department... should not be under an apprehension
that the motives that control his official conduct may, at
any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
n.15, the view that executive officers at all levels were, at least at one time,
subject to damage suits on the same basis as other citizens, see A. DIcEY, INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THr LAw OF THE CONSTITUTION 193 (10th ed. 1959),
has been sharply criticized. See Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55
MicH. L. IIzv. 201, 202 (1956); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L. REv. 209, 215-17 (1963). For a detailed view
of the history of suits against executive officers and the relation between such ac-
tions and other mechanisms for governmental accountability, see the series of arti-
cles written by Professor Borchard. Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34
YALE L.J. 1 (1924) (Part I); id. 129 (Part ]I); id. 229 (1925) (Part III);
Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926) (Part IV);
id. 757 (1927) (Part V); id. 1039 (Part VI); Borchard, Governmental Respon-
sibility in Tort, 28 COLUm. L. REv. 577 (1928) (Part VII); Borchard, Theories of
Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 28 COLuml. L. REv. 734 (1928) (Part
VIII).
42161 U.S. 483 (1896).
43Plaintiff Spalding was employed by a number of postmasters to obtain re-
view and readjustment of their salaries. After their claims for increased salaries
were rejected by the Postmaster General, Spalding, apparently operating as con-
tracting agent and lobbyist, made arrangements for his compensation from the
postmaster-clients contingent on his securing payment on their claims. He then
helped gain passage of legislation providing for payment of these claims by the
United States. Spalding alleged that Vilas, who became Postmaster General after
the original refusal of the claims advanced by Spalding, endeavored "'to . . .
harrass the plaintiff, and to injure him in his good name and in his business, with-
out any good reason therefor, and with malicious intent, . . . interposed all
possible obstacles to the collection of said claims, and undertook to induce the
clients of the plaintiff to repudiate the contracts they had made." Id. 486
(quoting from plaintiff's complaint). Vilas sent the funds voted by Congress
directly to each claimant, rather than to the attorney, along with a letter stating
that no attorney's services were necessary to present the claim before the depart-
ment, that Congress desired all the proceeds to reach the individual postmasters,
and that any transfer of the claim or power of attorney for receiving payment of
the claim was null and void. Spalding claimed compensatory damages of $25,000
for breach of the various contracts, and claimed an additional $75,000 for injur ,
to his good name and reputation. Id. 484-89.
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damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effec-
tive administration of public affairs as entrusted to the
executive branch of the government, if he were subjected
to any such restraint.44
Although the immunity of this first group of officials often
was framed broadly, the cases giving rise to the immunity are more
ambiguous. Many opinions underline the requirement that to be
immune the official must act within his jurisdiction.45 As applied
to most judges and legislators, this requirement does not seem to
have been taken very seriously.46 For judges sitting in courts of
special and limited jurisdiction, however, and for executive officers,
there appears to have been some confusion over this requirement.
At times the requirement of jurisdiction was taken to be separate
from authority, using the latter term to mean that the disputed
action was in fact consistent with ultimate interpretation of con-
trolling statutory and constitutional provisions. In Spalding, for
instance, the Court distinguished "action taken by the head of a
Department in reference to matters which are manifestly or palpably
beyond his authority, and action having more or less connection
with the general matters committed by law to his control or super-
vision." 47 The action having "more or less connection with the
general matters" assigned to an official could be found to be within
his jurisdiction but not in fact authorized. The Court in Spalding
did not need to apply this distinction between legal authority (acts
authorized by law) and jurisdiction (conduct related to subject
matters within which some action, though not necessarily the dis-
puted action, is authorized) because it found the Postmaster Gen-
eral's actions authorized by law.
48
An approach contrary to the Spalding dictum was taken in
other cases, holding acts to be within an official's jurisdiction only
when those particular acts were subsequently found to have been
-4 Id. 498.
45 See, e.g., Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 535 (1869); T.
COOLEY, supra note 36, § 315, at 437 n.38, 440 n.46 (citing cases).
46See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881) (finding defendants'
actions "in excess" of jurisdiction without finding the action outside defendants'
jurisdiction); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872) (same); Calhoun
v. Little, 106 Ga. 336, 32 S.E. 86 (1898) (same); National Sur. Co. v. Miller, 155
Miss. 115, 124 So. 251 (1929) (en banc) (same); Lange v. Benedict, 73 N.Y. 12
(1878) (same), writ of error dismissed, 99 U.S. 68 (1879).
47 161 U.S. at 498.
48 Id. 493.
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authorized. 49 A half-century before Spalding in Kendall v. Stokes, 0
another suit against the Postmaster General, this view was taken in
dissent by Justice McLean, the only Justice to speak directly to the
issue.51 Noting that the Postmaster acted "under the sanction of
the President, and in accordance with the opinion of the attorney-
general" in refusing to pay certain monies to the plaintiff, Justice
McLean nonetheless would have held the defendant liable in dam-
ages.52 He further would have applied this approach to all officials,
Supreme Court Justices and the President included.53
Generally, however, courts took an expansive view of juris-
diction for the officials in the first group, and, although the cases
are by no means uniform on this score,54 adopted the more restric-
tive view espoused by Justice McLean for all others.55 Thus, for
the second group of officials an action was not immunized by virtue
of the official's status unless authorized by law.56 An influential
example is Miller v. Horton,57 an 1891 decision of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts holding members of the board of
health of a Massachusetts township liable in damages for destroying
the plaintiff's horse. The defendants were ordered to kill the
horse by two commissioners on contagious disease who certified
that it was diseased. Veterinarians who also examined the horse
declared it healthy, and the defendants delayed killing it while
they attempted to persuade the commissioners to alter their order.
The commission would not do so, and defendants killed the horse.
The trial court found that the horse was not diseased, but held for
defendants on the question of liability. The appellate court, speak-
ing through Justice Holmes, reversed, stating that while defendants
49 See, e.g., Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877); Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 334 (1865); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 330 (1806).
5044 U.S. (3 How.) 92 (1845).
61Id. 903-16 (Appendix; McLean, J., dissenting). The majority disposed of
the case on the ground that the plaintiff in a prior case had secured mandamus
directing money to be credited to him. See Kendall v. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
524 (1838). The Court held the prior action a bar to the suit for damages, al-
though different sums were at issue in the two actions. 44 U.S. at 105-12.
52 44 U.S. at 909.
53 Id. 907.
54 See cases cited in 3 K. DAvis, ADmirsNTRATIvE LAw TnETnSE § 26.05, at
534-35 nn.16-17 (1958).
55 It was common to explain the different standards, when explicitly acknowl-
edged, by reference to the ministerial or discretionary nature of the action involved.
That distinction, however, is difficult to make meaningful in light of the cases. See
W. PNossER, supra note 37, § 132, at 988-92; Jaffe, supra note 41, at 218-19; James,
Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 610,
640-45 (1955); Jennings, supra note 36, at 284-302.
56 See cases cited in Engdahl, supra note 29, at 17 n.71.
57 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891).
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were cloaked with whatever authority the commissioners possessed,
that authority extended only to condemning animals that were in
fact diseased. Justice Holmes reasoned that the legislature could
not order all animals, healthy or not, destroyed without compensat-
ing the owners, that no compensation was provided for in the rel-
evant statute except such as the commissioners in their discretion
chose to grant, and that, consequently, the statute only authorized
the killing of animals in fact diseased, not those suspected of dis-
ease." Absent authorization by law, the commissioners and defend-
ants had no jurisdiction; the killing, therefore, was tortious. 0
Despite the application of a similar analysis in other cases,
also requiring a finding of authority under ultimate interpretation
of law, officials in this second (non-immune) group were not wholly
without protection. There were a number of specific privileges
they could claim even if they failed to establish legal authority for
their act. Such privileges sometimes were tied to a given official's
position; policemen, for example, could defend against an action
for false arrest on the strength of a facially valid warrant. 60  Other
privileges were particular applications of generally available de-
fenses such as the privilege of fair comment in actions for defama-
tion.61 These various privileges, along with the absence of any
right of action to redress certain harms,62 appear to have offered
officials in the second group considerable protection against damage
liability.
That was the state of the law when Judge Learned Hand
issued his 1949 opinion in Gregoire v. Biddle,6" a suit for false
arrest brought against the U.S. Attorney General, the Director of
the Enemy Alien Control Unit of the Department of Justice,
68 Id. at 542-48, 26 N.E. at 100-03.
59 The Miller decision is explained by Dickinson and Jennings as the result of
the absence of appropriate due process safeguards in the taking of tangible prop-
erty. Given the then-current views of property rights, and the limited circumstances
under which those rights gave way to "public" interests, no taking outside a narrow
set of emergency circumstances could be sustained absent opportunity for a hearing.
That opportunity, under the statute at issue in Miller, could only come in a damage
suit. See J. DrcEaNsoN, ADMInTuRATrvE JUSTICE AND = SUPREMACY OF LAW
r T=n UNn STATES 44-47, 107-08 (1927); Jennings, supra note 36, at 281-84.
See also McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336, 350 (1868).
60 See W. PNossER, supra note 37, § 25, at 127-28.
61 See Becht, supra note 36, at 1128-36; Handler & Klein, The Defense of
Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Executive Oflicials, 74 HAav. L.
REv. 44 (1960).
62 See T. COOLEY, supra note 36, § 300.
63 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
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and a District Director of Immigration." Hand explained the
necessity of absolute judicial immunity, noted its extension to
prosecutors charged with malicious prosecution 65 and, citing Spald-
ing, to some other executive officers, and held that all of the officials
sued by Gregoire similarly were covered by an absolute immunity
even if they acted maliciously, from personal spite, and without
legal basis:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who
is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon
others, or for any other personal motive not connected
with the public good, should not escape liability for the
injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice
to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be
monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing
so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is
well founded until the case has been tried, and that to sub-
mit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its out-
come, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute,
or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of
their duties .... In this instance it has been thought in
the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by
dishonest officials than to subject those who try to do their
duty to the constant dread of retaliation. 6
Judge Hand was careful to explain why an official's liability should
not turn on whether his acts were in fact authorized, despite the
frequency of dicta linking official immunity to legal authority:
The decisions have, indeed, always imposed a limita-
tion upon the immunity that the official's act must have
been within the scope of his powers; and it can be argued
that official powers, since they exist only for the public
good, never cover occasions where the public good is not
their aim, and hence that to exercise a power dishonestly
is necessarily to overstep its bounds. A moment's reflec-
tion shows, however, that that cannot be the meaning of
the limitation without defeating the whole doctrine. What
is meant by saying that the officer must be acting within
64 In all, five defendants were named-two successive Attorneys General and
two successive Directors of the Enemy Alien Control Unit in addition to the Dis-
trict Director of Immigration for Ellis Island.
65 Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curam, 275 U.S. 503
(1927), held that even allegations that a prosecutor acted maliciously in initiating
a prosecution would not be sufficient grounds for subjecting him to suit.
66 177 F.2d at 581.
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his power cannot be more than that the occasion must be
such as would have justified the act, if he had been using
his power for any of the purposes on whose account it was
vested in him.67
Without acknowledging his departure from precedent,6 Hand gen-
eralized the rationale for immunity to cover at least middle-level
officials, if not all officials. His construction of what brought an
action within an official's jurisdiction constituted a straightforward
rejection of the approach taken by Justice Holmes in Miller;
neither the nature of the defendant's office, nor the conduct at
issue, enter into the calculus. Thus, Gregoire began the break-
down of the established two-tier system of protections.
B. The Supreme Court: Development of a Qualified
Immunity Doctrine
Beginning a decade after Gregoire, the Supreme Court began
changing the law of official liability more substantially. Although
the Court did not create a single rule for all officials, it did make
all executive officers subject to the same rule. This was accomplished
by reducing the protections formerly accorded higher-ranking of-
ficers and expanding the protections accorded lower-ranking
officials.
The starting point was Barr v. Matteo,69 a defamation action
by two employees of the Office of Rent Stabilization against the
Acting Director of that unit. The defendant Barr had issued a
press release responding to inquiries about an agency practice of
questionable legality.70 In the press release, Barr named plaintiffs
67Id.
68 Hand cited a number of cases purportedly extending immunity to subcabinet
level officials. Examination of these cases reveals that all but one either involve
officials of Cabinet rank or turn on a specific privilege to communicate information
that might otherwise be defamatory. See Lang v. Wood, 92 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 686 (1937); Smith v. O'Brien, 88 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir.
1937); Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 605 (1934); Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 530 (1927). The lone exception is Brown v. Rudolph, 25 F.2d
540 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 605 (1928), adopting the less restrictive
view of jurisdiction for commissioners of the District of Columbia who decided
(improperly, the court holds) to commit the plaintiff as insane. The court does,
however, eplicitly find that defendants performed a function that called for their
exercise of discretion. In Gregoire, Hand does not tie his analysis to any require-
ment that the function forming the basis of the suit be deemed discretionary rather
than ministerial.
69360 U.S. 564 (1959).
7oThe agency's predecessor, the Office of Housing Expediter, expecting its
statutory existence to expire at the end of the fiscal year, had used some funds to
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as the employees responsible for the practice.71 The case came be-
fore the Court for disposition of Barr's claim that his statement,
if defamatory, was absolutely privileged. Justice Harlan, speaking
for a plurality of four, upheld the claim of privilege, relying prin-
cipally upon Gregoire and Spalding.2  He declared that the office
held by the defendant was irrelevant except as it related to the
scope of his discretion and adopted the broad view that activities
pursued within the scope of that discretion were privileged: "The
fact that the action here taken was within the outer perimeter of
[Barr's] line of duty is enough to render the privilege applica-
ble. .. ." 73
Eight years later in Pierson v. Ray,74 the Court again faced
a question of official liability, this time in a suit brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983,75 which makes liable those who under color of
state law infringe federally guaranteed rights.7 Plaintiffs claimed
that they were denied equal protection of the law when they were
arrested, convicted, and sentenced under a Mississippi breach-of-
peace statute for using segregated facilities and refusing to leave
when ordered by the police to do so. The arresting policemen,
and the judge who presided over plaintiffs' trial and sentenced
them, were named as defendants, and a false arrest count under
Mississippi law was joined with the section 1983 suit against the
policemen. Having earlier held that section 1983 did not abolish
immunities and privileges enjoyed under state law by legislators,
7 7
pay case settlements for unused annual leave. It immediately rehired the employees
on a temporary basis with the understanding that if the life of the agency was
extended, the employees would be rehired on a permanent basis. The practice was
held illegal by the General Accounting Office, but that decision was reversed by
the Court of Claims. Id. 565-66 & n.3.
71 Plaintiffs alleged that Barr acted maliciously in so doing. Id. 568.
72 Id. 569-76.
73 Id. 575. Justice Black concurred, restricting his opinion to the question
whether libel suits based on press releases would restrain officials from providing
information to the public. Id. 576-78 (Black, J., concurring). Chief Justice War-
ren and Justices Douglas and Brennan believed a qualified privilege sufficient, id.
578-86 (Warren, C.J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.); id 586-92 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), while Justice Stewart believed the disputed action was not within Barr's
authority, id. 592 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Thus, a total of four justices dissented.
74 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
75 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See note 263 infra for the text of the statute.
76In 1961, the Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), had rejected
the arguments of police officers sued under § 1983 that they did not act under
color of state law because state law did not authorize their actions but rather made
them illegal. Id. 172-87. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, urged that unconstitu-
tional actions condemned by state law should be left to the states to remedy while
§ 1983 should be used only to redress unconstitutional actions condoned by state
law. Id. 202-59 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
7 7 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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the Court quickly disposed of the charges against the judge, de-
claring that if judicial immunity were to be abrogated, Congress
should do so explicitly.78 The Court then noted that police officers
generally and under Mississippi law enjoyed a privilege from lia-
bility for false arrest or false imprisonment if they had probable
cause to believe the persons arrested or detained had violated a
statute and if they in good faith believed the statute to be valid.79
There was no explanation whether the rule of the majority of
American jurisdictions or of the state from which the suit arose
controlled. 0 Whatever the source of the privilege, the Court
plainly stated its view that this privilege was available in the section
1983 count as well as in the state law count, viewing the federal
action here as an analogue to the common law tort suit for false
arrest.81
The pivotal decision in the Supreme Court's line of official
liability cases followed seven years after Pierson. Scheuer v.
Rhodes82 -was a section 1983 damage action brought by represent-
atives of the estates of three students killed in the much-publicized
episode on the campus of Kent State University. Named defend-
ants included the Governor of Ohio, the Adjutant General of the
Ohio National Guard and his assistant, various officers and members
of the National Guard, and the president of the university. The
court of appeals below had advanced alternative grounds for bar-
ring the suit: first, the suit was barred by the eleventh amendment
and by state law of sovereign immunity; alternatively, it was barred
by a Gregoire-type immunity of executive officers for actions gen-
erally within their authority, without regard to the motivation for
such actions.8 3 The dissent argued that executive immunity was
fundamentally at odds with the purposes of section 1983.84 Eschew-
78 386 U.S. at 553-55.
79 Id. 555-56.
80 The Court subsequently did address this matter. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976), the Court plainly stated that it would read § 1983 as consistent
"with general principles of tort immunities and defenses," id. 418, indicating that
its synthesis of common law holdings, and not the rules of the state from which a
suit arises, will govern.
81386 U.S. at 557-58. Justice Douglas, dissenting, would not have allowed
any common law privileges or immunities as defenses to actions under § 1983. He
viewed the federal statute not as an attempt simply to give victims of official dis-
crimination a neutral forum for resolution of their common law claims but as an
effort to alter rules existing under common law that might operate to sanction
official discrimination. Id. 558-67 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
82416 U.S. 232 (1974).
S Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
84 Id. 447-68.
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ing the lines of decision proferred by both majority and dissent
below, the Supreme Court took its Pierson decision as the spring-
board for resolving the question now presented. The Court ob-
served that a defense of "good faith and probable cause" had been
recognized in Pierson and that this defense rested on considerations
similar to those supporting the privilege upheld in Barr. The
Court then continued:
These considerations suggest that, in varying scope,
a qualified immunity is available to officers of the execu-
tive branch of government, the variation being dependent
upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the
office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared
at the time of the action on which liability is sought to
be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the
belief formed at the time and in light of all the circum-
stances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis
for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts per-
formed in the course of official conduct.85
Given the absence of a factual record, these principles could not be
applied to the named defendants. Rather, the Court remanded
the case for inquiry
whether the Governor and his subordinate officers were
acting within the scope of their duties under the Constitu-
tion and laws of Ohio; whether they acted within the
range of discretion permitted the holders of such office
under Ohio law and whether they acted in good faith
both in proclaiming an emergency and as to the actions
taken to cope with the emergency so declared.86
The Scheuer decision thus created a generalized defense to
actions under section 1983, without regard to whether under state
law a similar, broader, or narrower defense would be available to
an official sued in tort for the same alleged wrong. Lower-ranking
officials who previously enjoyed only particular privileges to specific
tort actions share this "qualified immunity" with the chief execu-
tive of the state, who previously would have been immune from
suit for all acts within the "outer perimeter" of his authority. Al-
though the Court was not precise on how the defense of good
faith and reasonable grounds would be judged, the impression
conveyed was that more than a pro forma inquiry would be con-
85 416 U.S. at 247-48.
86 Id. 250.
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ducted into the congruence of an official's acts with the scope of
his authority and into the bona fides of his motivation for acting.
8 7
Presumably an adverse finding on either score would vitiate his
defense.
Although Scheuer can derive support from prior decisions, it
substantially alters the nature of defenses to official liability. The
Barr and Pierson decisions had set the stage for Scheuer-in Barr,
instead of relying on a specific privilege against defamation suits,
the Court extended broad official immunity to lower-level officials,
while in Pierson the Court recognized state privileges in a federal
action without clearly delineating the relation between them.
Scheuer, however, goes well beyond those decisions by melding a
specific privilege (for police officers sued in false arrest actions)
with the rationale for immunity to create universal "qualified im-
munity" for state officials sued under section 1983. For these offi-
cials, the breakdown of the formerly separate protections accorded
higher- and lower-ranking executive officers was complete.
Far from settling matters, Scheuer raised a number of other
questions. With rare exception, the Supreme Court, and lower
courts as well, have continued to replace formerly heterogeneous
defenses to liability with a single, uniform rule.88 Also with rare
exception, the rule bears ever less resemblance to the immunity of
Gregoire and Spalding. Since Scheuer, the Court has held that an
official bears the burden of pleading his immunity; plaintiffs need
not allege that an official acted outside the scope of his authority
or in bad faith.89 In most of the circuits, the official bears the
burden of persuasion for the immunity defense as well. 0 An official
87 The Court stressed the need for development of a factual record and for
affording plaintiffs the opportunity "to contest the facts" asserted to justify the de-
fendants' actions. Id. 249-50.
88 See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980); Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Procunier v. Navarette,
434 U.S. 555 (1978); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See also Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192
(D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd by an equally divided court, 49 U.S.L.W. 4782 (U.S. June
22, 1981) (No. 79-880); Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), appeal dismissed, 624 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1980).
89 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. at 639-41. The opinion for the Court in Gomez
does not clearly dictate the allocation of the burden of persuasion-only the bur-
den of pleading is discussed. Justice Rehnquist's concurrence stresses his under-
standing that the former matter was not decided. Id. 642 (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring). See note 90 infra & accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 1980); Jacobson v.
Rose, 592 F.2d 515, 523 (9th Cir. 1978) (extending qualified immunity defense to
suit under wiretap provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976)), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 930 (1979); Dellums
v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916
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will not benefit from his qualified immunity if he intends to de-
prive another of his federally secured rights, if he knows his actions
will do so, or if he "reasonably should have known." 91 Given the
imprecision with which many federal rights are defined,92 this gloss
on the Scheuer standard could, if adhered to, significantly diminish
the protection afforded by the Scheuer immunity. The standards
developed in section 1983 actions also have not been confined to
that arena, but have been extended to suits against federal officers.
93
Qualified immunity has replaced absolute immunity for Cabinet
officers,9 and lower courts have held that even the President enjoys
only a qualified immunity and must have acted in "good faith" to
escape liability.95
The melding of specific privileges formerly enjoyed by lower-
level officials with the immunity formerly enjoyed by higher-level
officers has been confined to decisions respecting executive officers.
Legislators and judges retain absolute immunity from liability for
their official acts. Even here, however, some changes have been
(1978); Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1071 (7th Cir. 1976),
modified in part, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc); Skehan v. Board of
Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 538 F.2d 53, 61-62 (3d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); McLallen v. Henderson, 492 F.2d 1298, 1300
(8th Cir. 1974); Jones v. Perrigan, 479 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1974); Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d
Cir. 1972), on remand from 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The First Circuit alone has
explicitly placed the burden of showing bad faith or absence of reasonable grounds
for belief on the plaintiff. Gaffney v. Silk, 488 F.2d 1248 (1st Cir. 1973).
91Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318-22 (1975). See also Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1978); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
576-77 (1975); Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 232-33 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
92 "Due process" was allegedly denied in the case giving rise to this standard.
See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 310 (1975).
93 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). See also Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14 (1980).
94 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 496-508 (1978). Especially note-
worthy is the Court's lengthy, and approving, quotation from Judge Leventhal's
opinion in Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1974), on the sufliciency
of qualified immunity for Cabinet-level offieials. 438 U.S. at 500 n.28 . Four
Justices, however, dissented on this point. Id. 517-30 (Rehnquist, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., and Stevens, J.).
95 Halperin v. Kissinger,, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 49 U.S.L.W. 4782 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 79-880). Although
the equally divided Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit's decision denying the President
absolute immunity, the Court simultaneously granted certiorari in another case to
examine whether the President was limited to the Scheuer-Butz qualified immunity.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 49 U.S.L.W. 3946 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 79-1738).
Certiorari was also granted to review whether the lower courts' routine require-
ment of trial on the qualified immunity defense vitiated the defense. Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 49 U.S.L.W. 3946 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-945). See also
Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), appeal dismissed, 624
F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1980).
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made. The Court has restricted the circumstances in which it will
accord legislators immunity, refusing to find legislators immune
unless the challenged activity can be shown to have been not merely
related to legislative activities but "essential to the deliberation" of
the revelant legislative body. 6
Although the Court similarly has sought to confine judicial
immunity to judges' judicial activities,97 it has not been so restric-
tive in its view of what acts by judges qualify for absolute immunity.
The Court's decision in Stump v. Sparkman 98 illustrates its rela-
tively tolerant attitude toward judges. The Court in Stump re-
versed a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit denying immunity to a judge who approved, on the day it was
filed, a mother's petition to have her daughter sterilized. The ap-
pellate court found no arguable statutory basis for entertaining
such a petition, much less for doing so without hearing from, ap-
pointing counsel for, or even notifying the minor girl.99 The basis
for the sterilization order was the mother's uncorroborated state-
ment that her fifteen-year-old daughter was "somewhat retarded"
and was associating with young men.100 Despite the dissents of
three Justices who argued that this was not in any meaningful
sense a "judicial" act, that it was not within the judge's jurisdiction,
and that without affording any of the normal protections of due
9 0 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130-33 (1979). See also Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Comment, Legislative Immunity and Con-
gressional Necessity, 68 GEO. L.J. 783 (1980). Eastland v. United States Service-
men's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), is an example of the less restrictive test for
immunity of legislators that the Court used before these recent decisions. East-
land was a suit to enjoin enforcement of a subpoena by the Senate Subcommittee
on Internal Security directing a bank to produce records concerning plaintiff or-
ganization's account. The Court found that the legislators' actions fell within the
"sphere of legitimate legislative activities" and held that the speech or debate
clause barred even injunctive actions relating to the legislature's investigatory
powers. Id. 501-07. See also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82
(1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
97 1n Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980),
the justices of the Supreme Court of Virginia were found not to be acting as
judges in promulgating and enforcing their state's Code of Professional Responsibility
for attorneys. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the judges were not entitled
to judicial immunity but instead were cloaked with legislative immunity in their
promulgation of the Code and prosecutorial immunity in its enforcement. Id.
731-37. Damages were not at issue in this suit.
98435 U.S. 349 (1978).
99 Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), rsad sub nom.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
100The girl, told she needed an appendectomy, was operated upon shortly
after approval of the petition and still without knowledge of it. The Court's
opinion provides a more complete factual background. 435 U.S. at 351-53.
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process it effectively cut off any other avenue of appeal, 1°1 the Court
upheld the judge's claim of immunity. The majority noted that
the petition came before him because he was a judge, he sat in a
court of general jurisdiction, and he was not acting in a personal,
executive, or legislative capacity when he signed the order approv-
ing the petition; therefore, he was absolutely immune from damage
liability under section 1983.102
The Court has also reaffirmed and extended the immunity en-
joyed by others connected with the judicial process or performing
judicial functions. Prosecutors again were held immune from dam-
age liability for initiating and pursuing criminal actions, regardless
of motivation, 10 3 and the judicial immunity also has been extended
to administrative officers who perform judicial functions. In Butz
v. Economou, for example, the Court held that federal administra-
tive hearing examiners as well as agency attorneys prosecuting an
action before the examiners were absolutely immune from damage
liability. 04 The same case held that the Cabinet officer to whom
those officials reported and who was ultimately responsible for the
decision at issue merited only a qualified immunity.10 5 Justice
Rehnquist, joined by three other Justices in dissent, commented:
If one were to hazard an informed guess as to why such a
distinction in teatment between judges and prosecutors, on
the one hand, and other public officials on the other, ob-
tains, mine would be that those who decide the common
law know through personal experience the sort of pressures
that might exist for such decisionmakers in the absence of
absolute immunity, but may not know or may have for-
gotten that similar pressures exist in the case of nonjudicial
public officials to whom difficult decisions are committed.
But the cynical among us might not unreasonably feel that
101 Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell dissented. Id. 364-69 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting, joined by Marshall & Powell, JJ.); id. 369-70 (Powell, J., dissenting).
102 Id. 356-64.
The five-Justice majority was not persuaded that the existence of explicit
statutory provisions allowing sterilization of institutionalized persons, after admin-
istrative hearings of a specified nature and judicial review, placed a limit on the
jurisdiction of Indiana judges to entertain sterilization petitions. Id. 358-59.
For a recent case more closely scrutinizing the "judicial" character of a judge's
actions, and holding the judge liable for nonjudicial acts, see Lopez v. Vanderwater,
620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 601 (1980).
103lImbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), reaffirmed the result of Yaselli
v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (per curiam). See note 65 supra & accompanying
text. A similar immunity for administrative officers performing functions analogous
to prosecutors was recognized in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-17 (1978).
104 438 U.S. 478, 508-14 (1978).
10 5 See note 94 supra & accompanying text.
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this is simply another unfortunate example of judges treat-
ing those who are not part of the judicial machinery as
"lesser breeds without the law." 106
A possible basis for the distinction decried by Justice Rehnquist
is examined in the next part. Even ignoring some possible costs of
the Supreme Court's qualified immunity for executive officers, it is
difficult to support fully the distinction drawn by the Court. That
distinction becomes increasingly suspect when its effect on behavior
of executive officials and the costs of administering the distinction
are taken into account.
III. THE ROLE AND COSTS OF OFFIcIAL LIBILITY
In moving from a two-tier immunity-privilege system to a one-
tier qualified immunity system for executive officials, the Supreme
Court has emphasized its concerns that government officials be con-
strained from inflicting harm on others and that the constraints
not interfere with proper performance of official duties.10 7 The
Court has concluded that these concerns are harmonized by allow-
ing liability except when the official has acted from acceptable mo-
tives and not far outside the desired range of performance. 08 Al-
though it discussed the same concerns in cases involving legislators
and judicial officers, the Court expressed the view that any liability-
based constraint on their actions would entail costs (in less-than-
optimal performance of their tasks) that exceed the beneficial effects
of a liability constraint. 109
The concerns just noted are those addressed in tort litigation
generally. Individual actions are presumed to respond to the actor's
calculation of the costs and benefits of possible types of conduct."0
106438 U.S. at 528 n.* (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., and Stevens, J.).
107 See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23 (1980); Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 497, 505-08 (1978); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-66
(1978).
108 See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240-42, 247-48 (1974).
10D See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-64 (1978); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311-13
(1973).
110 See, e.g., W. BLumr & H. KALVEN, supra note 10; G. CALABBlSI, supra
note 8, at 68-75; Posner, supra note 8. This cost-benefit calculation can include
personal views on the fairness of a contemplated action: if an individual has doubts
about the fairness of an action, a decision to take that action imposes a cost
(guilt?) on him; the feeling that he has done a "good deed," in contrast, confers
a benefit on him. Cf. Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and
Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL Sun. 83,
93-100 (1977) (providing an economic model to determine when tort law will
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The calculation may be sophisticated or unsophisticated-indeed,
it need not involve conscious choice with respect to each act.111
When there is reason to believe a class of actors will fail in their
personal calculations to take sufficient account of the effect their
actions have on others, damage liability presumptively can be used
to induce a more socially acceptable calculus.112 Provided that the
improvement in behavior is valued more highly than the costs of
obtaining it, liability will be appropriate. Otherwise, mechanisms
other than liability must be trusted to secure the desired be-
havior.18  The questions posed by these concerns are: given some
standard of desired behavior, what will damage remedies add to
or detract from attainment of that behavior, and what costs will
be incurred in order to accord the damage remedies? This part
examines whether the solution reached by the Court meets the
concerns articulated. Only the positive value of a damage remedy
for official misconduct (what a damage remedy adds to attaining
desired behavior) and the systemic cost of implementing such a
remedy are examined. Thus, it is assumed in this part that no
departure from desired behavior is induced by invocation of a
damage remedy; that issue is addressed in part IV.
Analysis of the impact of damage remedies on future behavior
and the systemic costs of applying them does not, of course, ex-
haust the list of possible inquiries respecting the propriety of
affording damage relief against officials for their actions. One
encourage rescues). A somewhat different aspect of the interrelation of fairness
goals with utility calculations is discussed in Henderson, supra note 8, at 1039-41.
111 See, e.g., Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Acci-
dents and General Deterrence, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 239 (1967); Posner, supra
note 8.
112This determination can be made either on the basis of some scheme for
categorizing activities, see G. CArinnEst, supra note 8, at 135-97, or on individual-
ized determinations that insufficient attention has been paid to particular costs,
see Posner, supra note 8. Admitting the ability of individuals to make the sort
of cost-benefit analysis presumed here does not, of course, necessarily mean that
a similar cost-benefit analysis is feasible when the costs and benefits are imposed
on different individuals. See Alchian, The Meaning of Utility Measurement, 43
Am. EcON. REv. 26 (1953); Epstein, supra note 9; Waldner, The Empirical Mean-
ingfulness of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 69 J. PHmr. 87 (1972). But any
process of social decisionmaking must (aside from the rare instances where "Pareto
optimal" decisions are possible) find some means for basing social decisions on an
assessment of the relative value of costs to one person and of benefits to another.
This article does not suggest a mechanism for making this assessment.
113 See, e.g., Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 Am.
B. FOUNDATION sthsrAmcH J. 87. The point sometimes is framed by proposing for
tort law the task of deterring certain types of harm while leaving to other means,
legal and nonlegal, the task of accomplishing "aspirational" goals respecting human
behavior. See J. HEDEnsoN & R. PfEAsoN, Tim TORTS PRocEss 411-14 (1975)
(materials concerning the absence of a general duty to rescue in American law).
But see Landes & Posner, supra note 110.
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could inquire whether it is fair to place the cost of official action on
the officer or to leave it on the plaintiff." 4 Or one could ask
whether concepts of optimal allocation of resources, as well as fair-
ness, support transferring the costs of official action from others to
the public officer." 5  By and large, however, the Court has not
spoken in terms of fairness or other reasons unrelated to behavioral
considerations for preferring compensation of plaintiffs, nor is it
likely that such concerns would explain the different treatment of
executive and judicial officials."16 Nonetheless, so that these con-
cerns may be separated clearly from the issues addressed here, it
will be assumed throughout this part and part IV that some other
compensatory mechanism is available to persons harmed by official
misconduct if the official is held immune.
A. Incentive Structures and Liability
The starting point for inquiry into the value of official lia-
bility to secure appropriate official behavior is examination of the
ways that personal incentives (other than avoiding liability) can be
structured into official positions. To this end, it is useful to
divide official activities into four highly schematic categories. These
categories describe different arrangements of nonliability incen-
tives governing official behavior. In assigning activities to the
various categories, the spectrum of effects of each activity is bi-
furcated into costs and benefits. These terms generally carry norma-
tive connotations: costs are bad effects; benefits are good effects.
When referring to an individual's view, that is how these terms
will be used. But what constitutes a "benefit" to one person may
be a "cost" to another. From a social standpoint, as these terms
are used in defining the different categories, costs and benefits may
be viewed as normatively interchangeable terms; they represent
opposing considerations in structuring any activity. To enable an
activity to produce more of one good, some other good must be
foregone or some risk of harm incurred. Either side of the equa-
tion may be labelled "cost" or "benefit' at this point so long as
the opposite side receives the other label."'7 At the socially optimal
"4 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1093-1101; Epstein,
supra note 9; Fletcher, supra note 9.
ix5 See G. CAi.-nrEsr, supra note 8, at 21, 39-67. See also Franklin, supra
note 12.
116 Stump v. Sparkman is a particularly good illustration. See notes 98-102
supra & accompanying text. See also Rosenberg, supra note 29.
"'7See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 2, 19-28 (1960).
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level, an activity's marginal costs and benefits will be equal: at that
level, more of the activity will decrease socially valued goods and
less of the activity would mean that additional socially valued goods
could be obtained by increasing the activity. 118
The four conceptually distinct categories are constructed on
the basis of how personal costs and benefits of official decisions
align with social costs and benefits. The categories are not descrip-
tions of actual official actions but only abstract statements of the
extremes possible in structuring individual officials' incentives. In
this section, the effect of liability on the four hypothetical cate-
gories of activity will be considered. The next section evaluates
the cost of imposing such liability standards. Although no official
will fit these extreme cases, actual officials may be seen as more
similar to one or another of these paradigms. Thus, section C
uses these categories to classify actual official activities, suggesting
the role liability might play in guiding each of these.
In category one, the official-actor personally bears all the costs
and reaps all the benefits of his activity. The remaining three cate-
gories, unlike the first, involve activities the costs and benefits of
which are shared by others in addition to the official. Moreover, in
these categories, costs and benefits are not distributed evenly across
the range of affected parties; instead, for each activity, one person
or group of persons principally benefits from the activity while
another person or group is disproportionately burdened with its
costs. Although all three categories present this uneven allocation
of costs and benefits, officials performing category two, three, and
four functions differ in the way the terms of their employment in-
duce them to take account of the interests of persons who are pri-
marily beneficiaries of an activity and the interests of those who
are primarily its costbearers. These differences in turn produce
different likelihoods that activities in these categories will reflect the
appropriate balance of costs and benefits. The activities comprising
category two are those for which the official's job produces a personal
cost-benefit calculus that leads the official systematically to favor
some class of beneficiaries or costbearers in a manner inconsistent
with the socially desirable result. In category three, the official's
job is structured so that he has balanced incentives to consider the
impact of his actions on both costbearers and beneficiaries. Cate-
gory four is composed of activities for which the terms of an official's
employment do not provide incentives to consider the activity's effect
either on those who benefit or on those who bear its costs.
11s See P. SAmunLsoN, EcoNomcs 495-98 (10th ed. 1976).
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Category one, even more than the other hypothetical categories,
is in reality an empty box. There are no activities within this
category for which the official-actor personally bears the costs and
reaps the benefits-in every case, there are external effects from
official action. This category is included here, however, because it
presents the limiting case for liability. If the actor and no one
else is directly and immediately affected by his acts, he has all the
incentives necessary to adjust the activity to produce the optimum
level of costs and benefits. This does not mean that the official
will never err in his attempts to strike the balance of costs and bene-
fits. It does mean that a damage penalty for errors would not
improve the official's incentives to perform his task properly. This
category can be made more realistic by positing that the activities
do result in external effects on some person or group of like per-
sons, but that each cost bearer is simultaneously a beneficiary. So
long as the costs and benefits are distributed in tandem, damage
liability will not improve incentives for optimal behavior.
Category two is at the opposite extreme. Personal incentives
are arrayed in a manner that is apt to produce consistent de-
partures from optimal behavior because the official is encouraged by
them to consider only one set of costs or benefits. Some monetary
penalty for activity that imposes too many costs on society or that
produces too few benefits could help balance the official's incen-
tives. At the appropriate level, this penalty would, together with
the official's other incentives, produce conduct that did not sys-
tematically depart from the ideal balance of social costs and bene-
fits. Again, even with this penalty counterbalancing the nonliability
incentive structure, some deviation from an objectively determined
ideal will occur because the official has only limited powers of
rationality-absent perfect officials, there always will be mistakes.
Categories three and four present intermediate cases. In cate-
gory three, the official has balanced incentives to consider both costs
and benefits. In contrast to category one, costbearers and bene-
ficiaries are different classes of people. The official, consequently,
will be more likely than one performing a category one activity to
produce too few benefits or too many costs. The official may feel
more favorably inclined to one class than to another, for instance,
because of some personal affinity for that class (independent of incen-
tives defining a category three position) or because that class has
invested resources effectively in convincing the official that an out-
come it favors does in fact harmonize costs and benefits. Even so,
unlike category two, the likelihood of systematic errors in one di-
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rection is low-the incentives to consider both types of effects are
relatively balanced and the resultant decisions should reflect that
balance.
Category four presents a clearer case for liability than do cate-
gories one or three. Absent incentives to consider costs or benefits,
the official might reach any result, near or far from the desirable
outcome. Across a range of category four decisionmakers, one
would not expect the sort of systematic bias in outcomes that cate-
gory two would produce. Because the activity's incentive structure
does not bias the official in one direction, any alignment of the
official's personal costs and benefits with either costbearers or bene-
ficiaries will be fortuitous and can shift from decision to decision.
The problem in category four activities is not that the official is
biased, but rather that the official may be uninterested. Absent
incentives to consider either social costs or benefits, the official
might always act in a way inconsistent with the social optimum
(though the direction and magnitude of his departures will not
be predictable). If category one presents the case in which all costs
and benefits are internalized and liability therefore is unnecessary,
category four presents the case in which no costs or benefits are
internalized and liability, if available, will provide the only insti-
tutional incentive to socially optimal official behavior. Under these
circumstances, liability may be useful, but if the classes of cost-
bearers and beneficiaries are not equally willing or able to prosecute
lawsuits, liability could skew the performance of category four ac-
tivities in the same manner that nonliability incentives skew cate-
gory two actions.
B. The Cost of Adjudicating Liability
The prior section evaluated the usefulness of a damage penalty
for failure to perform properly official activities of four highly
stylized types. No mention was made of the cost of formulating a
standard to guide imposition of a damage penalty or of the cost
of implementing that standard. The impact of these process costs
on the four categories of official activity is considered in this section.
Part IV takes up the impact of a second cost: increased performance
errors resulting from liability.
Damage liability was found to be unnecessary to improve in-
centives of officials in category one. The existence of any cost for
imposition of liability renders it unwise as well as unnecessary
because resources would be consumed without social gain. Given
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the patent disutility of liability for category one activity, this cate-
gory will not be discussed further.
Category two presented the extreme case for liability in a
world where it could be imposed at no cost. Obviously, however,
imposition of liability is not costless in the real world. Any gain
in better performance as a result of liability will have to be meas-
ured against its cost. The major elements determining the costs
of imposing liability are the clarity with which the standard of
desirable performance can be defined and the ease with which de-
partures from that standard can be identified.
Some elaboration of the sort of actions that comprise category
two is necessary in order to evaluate these costs. Before doing that,
one caveat is in order. In drawing separate categories of official
activity so starkly, the different impact of personal liability can be
seen, but only at the expense of some clear sense of actual activities
that might correspond to the categorization. Rather than officials
with incentives to respond wholly to one concern and not at all
to the other (or to respond equally to both), the reality is likely
to be officials who have significantly greater incentives to respond
to one concern or relatively balanced incentives to consider oppos-
ing interests. The illustrations of category two, three, or four ac-
tivities given in this section depart from the all-or-nothing defini-
tions given in section A, and at the same time continue to abstract
from a reality in which it is terribly difficult to determine what
incentives guide a particular type of official in performing a specific
task. In section C, an attempt will be made to integrate the conduct
for which damage awards have been sought with the categories
given here. For the moment, the examples are consistent with
one party's view of the official's incentives but are not offered as
factually correct.
With this caveat, a variety of official activities might be anal-
ogous to category two. Officials of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) passing on applications for authority to market new
drugs, for example, may be averse to adverse publicity from ap-
proval of dangerous drugs. By setting up careful, but time-consum-
ing and costly screening procedures for testing new drugs, the FDA
can reduce the chances that a drug later found to be dangerous
will be approved for human use. Those who might have been
prescribed a dangerous drug and who are susceptible to its dangers
would be beneficiaries of such procedures. These procedures, how-
ever, will delay or prevent the marketing of beneficial drugs as
well, and will increase the price of all new drugs. Producers, con-
19811 PUBLIC OFFICERS 1139
1140 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
sumers, and a second class of potential consumers (who would have
benefited from drugs not available to them) share the costs of pro-
cedural delays. Harm to these costbearers will be less obvious than
harm to the beneficiaries would be. The officials thus have a strong
incentive (fear of adverse publicity) for maximizing benefits of drug
screening, while incentives to reduce the costs of such screening
are weaker." 9
Police officers may have similarly imbalanced incentives. The
benefits from arresting persons who may commit or may have com-
mitted crimes accrue to the members of the community who are
potential victims of those crimes. Community members influential
in structuring the local government may ensure that more im-
mediate benefits accrue to the chief of police, and in turn to his
subordinates, from higher arrest rates and higher "solved" rates.
One of the costs from increased arrests will be an increase in the
number of persons wrongfully arrested, because arrests will always
be made on the basis of imperfect information, and an increase in
arrests (other things being equal) will entail a reduction in the
quantum of information required to make an arrest. Police officers,
however, may be relatively unconcerned about this cost of increased
arrests, especially if it is borne by individuals who, because of past
criminality or other characteristics that are disfavored by police, are
deemed undesirable.1
20
Neither of these activities admits of a precise, easily admin-
istrable performance standard. It is difficult to specify the quantum
of evidence that should be necessary to arrest, or the probabilities
of benefit and of risk that should prompt licensing of a new drug.
19 United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979), and its procedural his-
tory, see id. 548-51, provide an excellent illustration of the "new drug" procedures
utilized by the FDA. Interesting discussions of the social impact of drug laws
and FDA action can also be found in M. SHio, A NATIoN oF GuxT Pics
(1979); Merrill, Compensation For Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1
(1973); Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962
Drug Amendments, 81 J. PoL. EcoN. 1049 (1973); Seidman, The Politics of
Policy Analysis: Protection or Overprotection in Drug RegulationP, 1 R c. 22
(Jul./Aug. 1977).
120 Cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (allegations that police were
responsive to white businessmen in arresting blacks for disturbing the peace by
patronizing segregated establishments, but were unconcerned with imposition of
costs on arrestees); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964) (allegations
that at time of a highly publicized controversy concerning admission of the first
black student into the University of Mississippi, federal law enforcement officials
arrested and mistreated plaintiffs without reasonable basis for believing the arrestees
were involved in violent resistence to integration), cert denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965).
This skew also may be reflected in other police conduct short of arrests, such
as searches for incriminating evidence. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allegations that federal agents
made a warrantless entry and search of plaintiff's apartment).
[Vol. 129:1110
PUBLIC OFFICERS
There are, however, limits that can be drawn around the range of
permissible performance at relatively low cost. Some ground for
suspicion beyond a previous arrest record for generally similar
crimes, for instance, could be required of the police officer. That
standard could be enforced without great difficulty, although it
might well allow considerable scope for departure from the ideal.'
21
The police officer at least is engaged in conduct that does not differ
greatly from the run of private conduct constrained by tort rules,
although the occasion for engaging in that conduct does. There
is a larger difference between private activities and the activities
of an FDA official, and any standard constraining him risks depart-
ing from congressional intent in creating the FDA unless Congress
clearly specifies the considerations that should underlie a decision
to grant or withhold a license to market new drugs.
122
Even here, of course, some general limits can be articulated.
Although it is difficult to determine whether drugs are efficacious
and whether they are dangerous, the religious preferences of the
drug's marketer will rarely bear on either of these questions. More
generally, there is no reason to believe someone who is disliked
by the FDA official for reasons unrelated to the qualities of the
drug he proposes to offer for sale should be supposed less likely
than anyone else to be promoting a valuable new drug. Limiting
official action by penalizing these sorts of discriminations operates
to check a different kind of official error than is discussed above.
The first sort of error may be labelled a "performance error." The
type described in this paragraph may be called an "intent error."
The official commits a clear intent error when he knowingly acts to
disadvantage someone on bases unrelated to his assigned task.123
While standards respecting intent errors are more easily stated
than standards respecting performance errors, they are not neces-
sarily easier to administer. In many cases, the difficulty of judging
performance makes ascertaining intent errors difficult as well. Sup-
pose FDA Commissioner Jones denies a new drug license to Booker
Pharmaceuticals. Booker sues claiming that its application was
denied because the firm is wholly owned by blacks and Commis-
sioner Jones discriminates against blacks. Commissioner Jones
121 Cf. C. WHirEIEAD, CxnvMqAL PROCEDME §§ 3.01-.07 (1980) (discussing
the contours of the law of arrest).
122 Cf. R. MEBIL & P. HuTT, FOOD AiD DRUG LAW 369439 (1980) (dis-
cussing the new drug licensing process, including the difficulties encountered in
that process and criticisms of it).
123 Allegations of intent error axe not uncommon in damage suits against offi-
cials. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 481-83 (1978).
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denies the allegation; he recounts the various percentage proba-
bilities of different maladies resulting from the Booker drug and
also recounts the grounds for concluding that the drug is not ef-
ficacious. The reasons for denying the license, on performance
grounds, are based on extrapolations from experiments having no
direct correlation with the drug's behavior in humans in recom-
mended doses. There are no drugs for which the data yielded by
experiments are identical to those for the Booker drug. Absent
direct information concerning Commissioner Jones's intent or a
series of relatively similar sets of circumstances from which one
could draw an intuitive "regression analysis" to determine if the
applicant's race seemed to be the decisive factor, it is difficult to
assess the claim of intent error.124
The difficulties of assessing both performance and intent errors
are even greater in categories three and four than in category two.
Category three activity, for which an official has nonliability incen-
tives to respond both to interests in increasing benefits and to
interests in reducing costs, is illustrated by the following situation.
A legislator must vote on a bill to impose a substantial tax on the
sale of fossil fuels. His constituents for the most part are either
engaged in some aspect of the oil industry or in mining and purify-
ing uranium for nuclear power plants. The costs of the tax will
be borne in large measure by those with interests in oil, while the
benefits will go substantially to those in the nuclear fuel industry.
Both groups are likely to be influenced in their choices among
competing candidates in the upcoming election by the current rep-
resentative's vote on this issue. Each group will provide the legisla-
tor with information on the proposed tax's impact on society; each
group will argue that the result it favors will benefit society gen-
erally. The amount each group spends on this effort, on supporting
or opposing the representative in the next electoral campaign, or
on similar activities, is in large measure influenced by the size of
the group's gain or loss from enactment of the legislation. 25 In
responding to the interests of these groups, the legislator arguably
harmonizes social costs and benefits. 126 Indeed the legitimacy of
1
24 The difficulty of policing FDA decisions on new drugs is indicated by the
fact that there has been no successful challenge to an FDA refusal to license a
new drug. R. MEml & P. HTrU, supra note 122, at 415. See also id. 404-15
(collecting materials).
125 See Barro, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, 14 PUB. CHOiCE
19 (1973); Crain & Tollison, Campaign Expenditures and Political Competition,
19 J.L. & EcoN. 177 (1976); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL
J. EcoN. & MANAGEMENT Scr. 3 (1971).
126 The legislator, of course, need not intend that result. An intent to remain
in office or to accomplish some other personal goal is consistent with socially bene-
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these pressures is unquestioned; the legislator is expected to respond
to them, making the formulation of a standard delineating impermis-
sible pressures extremely difficult.
Many other official actions also could be analogized to category
three. Commissioners of regulatory agencies chiefly concerned
with regulation of competing industries might engage in activity
allocable to category three when deciding what rules should govern
that competition; 127 zoning board members planning future growth
patterns similarly might fit this pattern,'128 as might a supervisor
evaluating employees for promotion.129 None of these activities,
of course, will necessarily be governed by incentives to balance
appropriately both costs and benefits, but each could be.
The costs of evaluating category three decisions are likely to
be quite high. What, for instance, is the standard by which to
judge the propriety of imposing a tax on fossil fuel sales? Many
activities that resemble category three are ones for which articula-
tion of performance standards, other than in conclusory terms, is
very difficult. The legislator, for example, is asked to determine
which course of action among many best harmonizes costs and
benefits. For those parties whose interest in the decision is strong
enough, there will be ample incentive to provide information (or
misinformation) supporting the position they favor; yet, it may be
extremely difficult to evaluate this information in the context of a
legislative information-gathering process. Furthermore, the legis-
lator is answerable in some degree to many persons who are neither
burdened nor benefited sufficiently by any course of action to
warrant the costs of making their views known, but who none-
theless may be affected by the decision. 30 Assessing the interests of
these persons may be even more costly than analyzing the accuracy
ficial conduct, given the distribution of incentives described in the hypothetical.
See, e.g., Crain & Tollison, Attenuated Property Rights and the Market for Gov-
ernors, 20 J.L. & ECON. 205 (1977).
127Cf. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam)
(reviewing FCC rules restricting cable television), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977). The process by which the FCC reached its decision reviewed in Home
Box Office is related in Cellhom & Robinson, Rulemaking "Due Process": An In-
conclusive Dialogue, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 201 (1981).
128Cf. Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980)
(granting immunity to local officials enacting zoning laws); Just v. Marinette
County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (upholding shoreland zoning
ordinances). See also Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALX
LJ. 149 (1971).
129 Cf. Gordon v. Adcock, 441 F.2d 261 (9th Ci.) (immunizing superior offi-
cer in air force from suit despite his negative evaluation of applicant), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 833 (1971).
130 See, e.g., Stigler, Economic Competition and Political Competition, 13 PuB.
CHorcE 91 (1972).
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of information brought to the legislator's attention: costlier still
would be a determination of whether the legislator had fairly
assessed those interests.
Legislators are enjoined to follow perhaps the least specific of
any performance standard: they are directed to harmonize social
costs and benefits without any articulation of the values by which
costs and benefits are to be judged. The network of constraints to
which they are subject-including their party affiliation, their desire
to secure votes and campaign contributions for purposes of re-
election, and their ambition for higher office or for secure and
remunerative future employment-may operate quite imperfectly
to give legislators real incentives to strike the cost-benefit balance
properly.1 1 Highly valued concerns of minority interests or con-
cerns very widely shared that in the aggregate are of enormous
social value may not receive adequate consideration by any given
legislator or by all legislators. 1 2  Nonetheless, constructing a
standard by which to judge their performance requires some clear
notion of the manner in which the social balance should be struck.
In large measure, our system of governance makes the result of
legislators' performance the determinant of how social concerns are
balanced. 133 To the extent the Constitution limits legislative free-
dom, it does so through imprecise statements that require, as well
as embody, additional balancing. 3  It seldom provides clear per-
formance standards. Almost any constitutional decision picked at
random from opinions of the Supreme Court is illustrative: if, for
instance, fiscal concerns merit restriction of federal retirement
benefits, are due process concerns sufficient to tilt the social balance
against such restrictions? 135
The difficulty of assessing performance of legislative tasks and
of other, similar activities that might resemble category three sup-
ports limitations on the scope of inquiry into such decisions. This
is consistent with the grant of considerable discretion to officials
performing category three functions. Even outside the legislative
-13IThere is substantial literature on the operation of democratic decision-
making processes focused on the incentives of individual actors. Readable ex-
plications of "public choice theory" include J. BUCHANAN & G. Tur.ocE, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); M. OLSON, THE Locic OF COLLECTVE ACTION
(1965); W. RTxnt & P. OIDEsHOoK, A INTRODUCTION TO PosrrTVE PoxaTIcAL
THEORY (1973).
132 See authorities cited in note 131 supra; Stigler, supra note 125.
133 See generally A. BiCKEL, supra note 23, at 16; J. ELY, supra note 23, at
87; L. HAND, THE BmL OF RicHTs 1-30 (1958).
134 See, e.g., Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78
CoLum. L. REV. 1022 (1978).
135 See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 101 S. Ct. 453 (1980).
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sphere, such officials often are freed from requirements that they
rely upon information presented by the participating parties or
that they rigorously justify a choice to shape their action in one
fashion rather than another.136 More than the most general review
of these actions would require some other official to replicate the
exercise of judgment either at greater cost (in obtaining and
verifying information) or on similarly ambiguous and perhaps un-
trustworthy information. Only greater respect for the second offi-
cial's judgment would seem to justify significant review of category
three actions. Were the latter official's judgment more valued,
might it not be better for him simply to replace the first?
Review of category four decisions presents difficulties similar
to those encountered in category three. Activity analogous to
category four might be the work of a federal judge disposing of a
petition, ruling on motions, or rendering judgment in a suit. For
any decision, one of the litigants will bear the costs, the other will
benefit; the litigants will often represent (formally or informally)
those classes who will similarly bear the costs or reap the benefits. 37
As with lobbying and related functions, the expenditures of each
group on litigation will be determined in part by the value of a
particular outcome to that group. 33 Even if the investment in
litigation resources were proportional to anticipated gains or losses,
however, judges lack any significant incentive, intrinsic to the judi-
cial process, for responding to the parties' (and ultimately the
society's) interests in minimizing costs on the one hand and
maximizing benefits on the other. The salaries of the judges are
not adjusted upward or downward according to the extent to which
36 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 706 (1976) (provisions of Administrative Pro-
cedure Act providing for rulemaking and judicial review); Kendler v. Wirtz, 388
F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1968). The rules governing "scope of review" of administra-
tive actions, if not the judicial implementation of those rules, appear designed,
inter alia, to preserve room for discretion in the exercise of category three activi-
ties. For two views of this area, see the discussion in L. JAFFE, JmicmAx CoNTrrOL
oF An im-sTRA=w ACTION 546-623 (1965), and materials collected in J. MAsaw
& R. MERBILL, rIRODUCTION TO THE AmBIcAT PUBLIC LAw SxSTvs 785-808
(1975).
137 See Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUn.
235, 236-59 (1979). Although the immediate parties to a suit are likely to be
most affected, and where interests of others are substantially at stake a variety
of devices (class actions, joinder rules, estoppel rules, amicus participation) will
allow them either to participate in the litigation or be protected against undue
effect by its outcome, suits nevertheless may affect numerous nonparticipants. See,
e.g., Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19
J.L. & EcoN. 249 (1976).
133 Although once a contest is begun, the values of the cost to one side and
the benefit to the other may be largely equivalent, they need not be identical.
See notes 170-92 infra & accompanying text.
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they minimize costs, maximize benefits, or harmonize the two.139
Nor, at least with federal judges, is their job tenure imperilled or
enhanced by their decision. Finally, judges need not be concerned
about the reactions of the parties before them. It certainly is the
common expectation that judges will not receive incentives to decide
one way or the other directly from parties to the case.
The absence of direct incentives to adjust costs and benefits
does not mean, of course, that socially disfavored action will result.
To the contrary, it has been argued that decisions of Anglo-
American judges tend to strike the balance of social costs and
benefits fairly well and that decisions to the contrary do not long
survive. 140 Enhancing a judge's reputation among scholars or
lawyers, reducing the likelihood of reversal (for judges of lower or
intermediate courts), and limiting criticism by legislators and cit-
izens have been given as reasons judges might reach appropriate
solutions despite the absence of direct incentives. 41 Ideally, these
indirect (noninstitutional) incentives give judges the same impetus
to balance social costs and benefits that a hypothetical category three
actor would have. To perform this function, these incentives must
focus less on the problem of individual erroneous decisions-ones
that depart from the social ideal-than on the seriousness with
which the judge takes his task. The greatest penalties, thus, are
reserved for the judge who refuses to work or who is positively
arbitrary in his decisions rather than for the judge whose elaborately
139 The legislature might refuse to raise judges' salaries to keep pace with infla-
tionary decreases in the value of money. See United States v. Will, 101 S. Ct.
471 (1980); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). Because the legislature must decide for all
judges at one time whether to increase judicial salaries, and because any determina-
tion respecting consistency with social good would thus require review of many
individual decisions, it is most unlikely that even this potential for control over
judges' incomes will translate into any direct incentive to reach a particular out-
come in a given case.
14 0 See Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law,
7 J. LEGAL STun. 393 (1978); Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 399 (1980); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection
of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STurn. 65 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Priest, The
Common Law Process]; Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL
STuD. 51 (1977).
141 E.g., R. POSNia, EcoNomic ANALYSis OF LAw § 19.7 (2d ed. 1977). The
argument also is made that parties will have incentives to relitigate incorrect legal
rules, ultimately arriving at rules that (because efficient) will not need repeated
litigation. See Priest, The Common Law Process, supra note 140, at 73-75; Rubin,
supra note 140, at 53-57. A different argument reaching the same result is that
even if litigation is randomly generated, differential expenditures in influencing
the outcome will favor creation of efficient rules. Goodman, supra note 140, at
394-405. This latter argument, however, rests on assumptions (such as that liti-
gants' expenditures will be roughly congruent with social interests in the outcome)
that are not free from serious question.
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reasoned opinion, replete with citations, reaches an outcome widely
perceived to be incorrect.
Whether officials performing category four activities arrive at
socially valued solutions frequently or seldom, the cost of assessing
liability for their decisions is likely to be greater than in most other
situations. The isolation of these officials from the pressure of
interested groups reflects a belief that those groups alone cannot
adequately represent societal interest.142 Not infrequently, difficult
decisions must be rendered on the basis of complex, ambiguous,
or conflicting information. In determining whether an error was
made and assessing liability for it, the same difficult decisions must
be repeated. If they are to be of greater accuracy than the initial
decision, these decisions must be accompanied either by better
information than was initially available or by better mechanisms
for weighing and sifting information used initially.143 Imagine,
for instance, a judgment in a complicated securities or antitrust
case being reviewed for error to determine whether the trial judge
should be liable in damages. The issues litigated initially would
have to be reexamined in a trial setting with its attendant complex
of procedures for eliciting and evaluating information. 44 Repeated
trials of the same issue would become phenomenally costly. That
is one reason why superior courts (at least ostensibly) review a
narrower range of issues than do the inferior courts.' 45 The avail-
ability of nonliability review mechanisms, of course, reflects con-
cern over the initial decisionmaker's likelihood of ascertaining the
' 42 See Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Per-
spective, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 875 (1975).
143 Generally, in reviewing judicial decisions, more information will not be
considered nor will more elaborate means be employed for testing the veracity
of information that may be subject to confirmation or rejection. In the context of
ordinary judicial review, however, the superior court judges are viewed as a
"better mechanism" for evaluating the relevant information; better, if not in some
easily definable skill, at least in the predicted consonance of their judgments with
legislative and executive determination of what is social good.
144 In damage actions against officials, the seventh amendments guarantee of
the right to jury trial is likely to produce this result even if less complex mecha-
nisms for evaluating the information are available. Tort actions for damages will,
under the current view of the seventh amendment, give plaintiffs and officials the
right to demand a jury trial with its attendant procedures and costs. See Mc-
Cormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of
Constitutional Protections, Part 1, 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 66-70 (1974). But see In
Re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir.
1980).
145 See, e.g., Yale v. National Indemnity Co., 602 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817
(1976); Jenkins v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1975);
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
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best outcome. At the same time, availability of these mechanisms
reduces the likely damage from erroneous initial decisions and
offers a .lower-cost alternative to liability for correcting them.
146
C. The Court's Assessment of the Cost of Formulating
Liability Standards
If the analysis of individual officer liability stops at this point,
still constrained by the assumption that compensation is available
from other sources and only taking cognizance of the general de-
terrent utility of such liability and one of its costs (the systematic
cost of formulating and applying liability rules), the result reached
is broadly consistent with the pattern of Supreme Court decisions.
The one-cost model developed thus far suggests that no liability
should be imposed for category three or four activities because the
gains from such alteration of incentives as liability may produce
will be slight and the costs of replicating these decisions generally
will be great. Development of performance standards that provide
significant guidance to operating officials or to their reviewers will
be extremely difficult in these categories, and the construction and
implementation of performance standards for them will be costly.
Checking intent errors, while less costly, also will be difficult for
category three and four conduct, a difficulty derived from the
problem of specifying performance standards. For category two
activities, the gains from using personal liability are greater and
the costs of reviewing these decisions frequently are less. None-
theless, creation and application of precise performance standards
for these activities will be costly. Allowing some range of toler-
able performance within which no penalty attaches would seem to
be a suitable compromise, securing a beneficial counterweight to
imbalanced incentives without necessitating undue cost.
The costs of formulating even these flexible performance
standards still may be high. It may, and undoubtedly would, be
extraordinarily difficult to calibrate the standard and the magnitude
of the damage penalty so as to create a counterweight of correct
proportion to balance each official's incentives. Yet, the one-cost
model would support making that effort for category two activities.
The separation of activities among the various categories also
may prove difficult. How, for example, would an agency director's
issuance of a press release about two employees, the conduct at
146 Unlike liability, of course, judicial review does not prevent errors except
insofar as lower court judges (or analogous officials) correctly predict the likeli-
hood of reversal and adjust their behavior accordingly.
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issue in Barr v. Matteo,147 be characterized? To ascertain the
appropriate category to which a given official action should be
analogized requires consideration of the specific incentives pro-
vided an official in performing the activity at issue. In each case,
it must be asked how the official's performance of that activity is
likely to be affected by such incentives as income, chance of promo-
tion, job assignments, the difficulty, duration, or pleasantness of his
work, or other avenues for gratification. Although a few official
actions may admit of easy categorization, it will require considerable
information to answer this question with respect to most officials,
information that is likely to be quite costly to acquire and evaluate.
There have been various attempts in the legal literature to
divide official actions along lines that permit easier identification. 14
Each of these alternative classification schemes may be viewed as
an attempt to identify the incentives controlling broad areas of
147360 U.S. 564 (1959). See notes 69-73 supra & accompanying text.
148 1n the official liability area, two serious attempts at categorization have
been made, by Professors Epstein and Mashaw. Epstein divides official action,
or more precisely tort suits challenging official action, into three categories: (1)
actions affecting "passive plaintiffs"; (2) actions affecting "participating plaintiffs,"
and (3) "quasi-judicial" actions, which include licensing, prosecutorial decisions,
and actions by school teachers and judges. Epstein would grant no immunity to
officials whose actions affect individuals whether unwillingly or willingly involved,
although he would use a strict liability standard for the former group of cases
and a negligence (or similar) standard for the latter. Epstein, supra note 29, at
55-58. For the third group of actions, Epstein would confer some immunity on
the defendants, reasoning that if there were a private law analogue, that result
would be reached by contract. Id. 58-63. Because there is a private law analogue
for school teachers without any evidence of contractual waivers of students' or
parents' rights to sue in tort, Epstein's argument appears curious. One might, how-
ever, reformulate Epstein's explanation for his categories in more persuasive fashion
by noting that where plaintiffs are not participants in the activity concerned their
interests are less likely to be considered carefully by the actor than where the plain-
tiffs are in a consensual relationship with the official-actor; hence, there is greater
need for liability in the first case than in the second. Cf. Epstein, supra note 113
(arguing the case for private contractual control over medical malpractice). For
the final "quasi-judicial" category, Epstein might be trying to identify those cases
where liability is inappropriate because the official's incentives to good behavior
are, generally, adequate. See Epstein, supra note 29, at 62-63. Yet Epstein's
categories cannot without difficulty be made to match up with any realistic ap-
praisal of officials' incentives.
Mashaw's categorization divides officials' actions into four categories: (1)
enforcement; (2) authorizations; (3) grants and benefits, and (4) proprietary
functions. Mashaw, supra note 29, at 10-14. Having thus divided official actions,
'however, Mashaw makes no further use of the divisions except to note that the
current imbalance in available causes of action may lead to a skew in suits con-
cerning, and hence in performance of, enforcement activity. Id. 29-31. Although
one might attempt to align Mashaw's categories with some assessment of nonlia-
bility incentives to good performance, it is difficult to fit those two schemes to-
gether. Enforcement activities may be ones for which incentives are frequently
imbalanced; that may not be the case with authorizations. More likely, each of
Mashaw's categories will encompass some officials who enjoy, and others who lack,
ample nonliability incentives to good behavior.
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official conduct.149 Unfortunately, the vast numbers of different
persons and actions covered by each classification prevents the classes
of conduct identified by such schemes from correlating well with
the nonliability incentives actually faced by officials. 150
Even so, it seems plausible to analogize at least "core" legisla-
tive activities to category three and "core" judicial activities to
category four.' 5' The court's refusal to allow official liability for
these activities, whether for performance errors or for intent errors,
and even under a statute that on its face creates no exemptions
from liability, then, would strike the balance properly. 52 Similarly,
it is plausible to analogize a wide range of executive functions to
category two. Pierson v. Ray 15 provides a good example. Police
officers in Mississippi at the time that case arose were sensitive to
the concerns of white businessmen but not to the interests of
blacks in being served by those businesses without risking arrest.
Executive functions that are fairly easily analogized to category
149 Writings unconcerned with official liability have been more explicit in
attempting to distinguish situations differing one from another in the incentive
structure governing particular types of behavior. Professor Macneil's tripartite
division for contract law, for instance, identifies classes of dealing where parties'
relationships (and incentives to engage in activity maximizing their joint, as op-
posed to individual, product) might be expected to differ. See Macneil, Con-
tracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical,
and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854 (1978). Professor William-
son has followed Macneil's work with an article focusing on the peculiar incen-
tives that appear in certain relationships that give rise, because of the existence
of particularized information that cannot be obtained costlessly, to occasions for
"opportunistic" behavior. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Gov-
ernance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 233 (1979). A similar focus
has informed some writings on the theory of the firm, see Fama, supra note 27;
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 27, and on torts, see Shavell, Strict Liability versus
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980). These authors, too, have had difficulty
finding factors that can separate instances where the various incentives to socially
optimal behavior work well from those where they work poorly. Factors such
as the duration of a relation (long-term, short-term, single-event), its consensual
or nonconsensual nature, the number of parties involved, or the opportunity for
duplicating the relation with different parties may affect the governing incentive
structure. To date, however, these or other relevant factors have not been or-
ganized in a theory that allows meaningful identification of distinct categories of
activity according to the likelihood that socially desirable outcomes will result.
150 In part, the difficulty of aligning activities with incentives is attributable to
the difference an individual's position in government (or any enterprise) will
make to his incentives in respect to what may appear to be a single activity
whether performed by high-ranking or low-level officials. See text accompanying
notes 156-59 infra.
'51 Plainly, not all functions performed by legislators or judges would qualify
as analogous to categories three or four. For a classic category two activity that
might be labelled "judicial," see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (invalidat-
ing legal proceedings in which the adjudicating official received a share of the
fines levied against persons convicted of offenses).
152 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367 (1951).
'53 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See notes 74-81 supra & accompanying text.
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two, notably those performed by police and prison officials,154 are
usefully checked by liability for either significant performance
errors or for intent errors. The good faith and reasonable grounds
defense of Pierson and Scheuer v. Rhodes,155 which now is ap-
plicable to all executive officers save those clearly connected with
"judicial" tasks, seems designed to give liability for these officials
the contours suggested thus far for category two.
While the Court and one-cost model are thus generally in
accord, the Court's uniform treatment of all executive officers sweeps
into the qualified immunity fold officials whose activities seem to
be more closely analogous to category three or four than to category
two. The conduct in Pierson may be thought to fit category two
fairly well, but what of the acts at issue in Scheuer? Among the
allegations of the Scheuer complaint were that the Governor of
Ohio called out the National Guard unnecessarily and that he
and the Adjutant General of the Ohio National Guard did not
ensure that Guard members were adequately prepared to handle
an emergency without use of lethal force.156 It is difficult to argue
convincingly that the chief executive of a state has inadequate in-
centives to weigh the benefit in protection of persons and property
against the possible cost in injury or loss of life when he decides
whether to call out the National Guard. The governor of a state
is a person of great public visibility; most of his official activities
are scrutinized by the press and by interested individuals. He likely
will be asked to account both for injuries resulting from failure
to call out the National Guard to control a volatile situation and
for injuries resulting from actions of the Guard. Even if he is
not eligible for or interested in reelection, the Governor is likely
to be concerned (whether for the sake of his reputation or for the
sake of his party's candidates in the coming election) with avoiding
errors resulting from too little or too much use of force.
Similarly, it is by no means apparent that the Secretary of
Agriculture, for whom Butz v. Economou 5 7 found the qualified
54 Police and prison officials are the officers most frequently subject to suit.
See, e.g., Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1974); Boulware v. Parker, 457
F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1972). Both of these cases challenged particular uses of
disciplinary measures such as solitary confinement; injunctive relief was granted
in Hoitt. See also Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (awarding dam-
ages to prisoner who had been stripped and placed in cell without bed or hygienic
facilities to discipline him for "rebellious" conduct), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885
(1972). See notes 188-92 infra & accompanying text.
155416 U.S. 232 (1974). See notes 82-86 supra & accompanying text.
156 See Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 432-33 (6th Cir. 1972), ree'd sub
nom. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). The Supreme Court gave a shorter
statement of the facts alleged. 416 U.S. at 235.
157438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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immunity defense sufficient, makes decisions under pressures more
skewed than those operating on his subordinates who were granted
broad immunity by the same decision. 158 The head of a Cabinet
department, directly responsible to the President, frequently ex-
amined by the Congress, and visible to the press, can be expected
to fall closer to category three than to category two to the extent
he is involved in setting general policies for handling revocations
such as that at issue in Butz, and closer to category four insofar as
he is involved in disposing of any particular case.' 59 It cannot be
denied that intent errors, as well as performance errors, might occur
at the very highest levels of government. As with category three
and four activities generally, however, the need for damage liability
to provide incentives to avoid such errors is slight and the cost of
detecting such errors through damage suits is substantial. At least
so long as it is assumed that compensation is otherwise available, it
would appear that high-ranking government officers are more
appropriately accorded the same immunity as legislators and judges
enjoy.
In defense of the Court's integration of high-ranking officers
with other executive officials, it might be argued that the Court
effectively has retained the benefit of absolute immunity for such
officials without the need for locating the bright line between im-
mune executive officers and those enjoying the hybrid qualified
immunity. The performance standard itself, as well as the rigor
with which an official is held to it, determines the nature of the
liability constraint. Insofar as courts have judged high-ranking
158 Broad immunity was granted to the administrative law judge and to the
attorney presenting the case for revoking the plaintiff Economou's registration as
a commodities future merchant. Id. 508-17. The revocation action was com-
menced following audits of plaintiff Economou's company. The officer of the
Department of Agriculture initiating the proceeding charged, on the basis of in-
formation revealed by the audits, that Economou willfully had failed to observe
the Department's regulations concerning financial reserves of registered commodities
futures dealers. There is no evidence that Secretary Butz had any connection
with the case prior to Economou's appeal to him from the administrative law
judge's recommended decision, nor was Butz alleged to have any personal rela-
tionship with Economou or his competitors. Indeed, there was no evidence that
Butz, who had delegated his review authority to a department judicial officer, had
any direct connection with the decision, and certainly no evidence that Economou
lacked ample protection against errant official action. He received a formal hearing
before a hearing examiner who was insulated from other employees of the De-
partment. He also had the opportunity to present testimony, to cross-examine
witnesses, and to utilize a series of other protections. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556
(1976); 17 C.F.R. §§ 8.01-11.8 (1980). Moreover, Economou had the opportunity
for judicial review; indeed, he secured reversal of the Department's action due to
noncompliance with certain departmental guidelines. Economou v. U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture, 494 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
159 See generally W. NisKAN-m-N, BUREAUCRACy AND RE:PRESENTATIVE GoVERN-
MENT 22-42 (1971); Shepsle, supra note 29, at 44.
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executive officials by more lenient performance standards than
might be devised for lower-ranking officers, the application of a
uniform qualified immunity defense may allow treatment for the
former group of officials more nearly approximating the absolute
immunity accorded judges and legislators. 160 In this regard, the
paucity of damage judgments against high-ranking officials is note-
worthy, suggesting that courts in fact treat their conduct in the
manner suggested here for category three. Moreover, the willing-
ness of courts in many instances to use fairly charitable performance
standards in assessing the liability of even relatively low-level
officials suggests a recognition that many executive officers are con-
strained by incentives intermediate between those described in
categories two and three.161 Thus, the performance standards em-
ployed by the courts may reduce the impact of the disparity between
the analysis presented here and the Court's decisions respecting
immunity for executive officials.
IV. OVERDETERRENCE: EFFECTS OF LIABILITY
Although the Court's treatment of official liability fits reason-
ably well with a model limited to consideration of a single cost of
liability (the difficulty of evaluating official decisions), there is
another significant cost to official liability: the potential for over-
deterring official action. The possibility that liability for one sort
of official error could induce errors in the opposite direction has
received considerable attention from the courts. That was the
principal concern expressed by Justice Harlan in Spalding v.
Vilas 16 2 and by Judge Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle.6 3  It also has
been offered as the main justification for absolute immunity of
legislators and judges.164 This part examines the possible over-
deterrence effects of liability and responses that might limit those
effects.
A. Assessing Overdeterrence
The concern with overdeterrence is far from trivial. Take an
activity that arguably falls within category two-arrest of suspects
who have prior convictions. The police officer presumably has rela-
160 See, e.g., Cofone v. Manson, 594 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1979).
161 See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Galella v. Onassis, 487
F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
162 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
163 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
164 E.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-64 (1978); Tenney v. Brand-
hove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1951).
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tively strong incentives to arrest and relatively weak incentives to
delay until he can develop additional or more accurate information
linking the suspect to the crime at issue.68 Liability for wrongful
arrest will provide a counterweight to his imbalance in incentives.
This counterweight, which could be termed the "liability in-
centive" or the "expected damage penalty," ideally should be just
enough to discourage arrest whenever the social costs of an arrest
exceed the social benefit. Any greater expected damage penalty
will discourage arrests in situations where the social benefits of such
action exceed its cost.
16 6
A term such as expected damage penalty usually connotes the
current value to an actor of a future damage judgment against him
discounted by the judgment's improbability. Viewed thus, three
elements are widely recognized as critical to determining the ex-
pected damage penalty: the standard for assessing liability; the
defenses to liability, and the magnitude of the penalty imposed in
the event of liability. It has been urged in other contexts that,
despite the difficulty of the task, courts have performed well in
combining these elements to produce an expected damage penalty
of the appropriate magnitude to offset imbalanced nonliability
incentives. 167
Rightly understood, however, there is a fourth element-like-
lihood of suit-that is also critical to calibration of the liability
incentive. Generally, this element is ignored, on the assumption
that if the purpose of suit for the plaintiff is to secure money dam-
ages, suits as a rule will be brought whenever the probable award
exceeds the probable costs of litigating. 68 Under this assumption,
the other three elements dictate the likelihood of suit. Following
this analysis, there is no need to take account of the additional
penalty (beyond the expected damage award) exacted of successful
165 The group from which suspects are most likely to be drawn-those who
have engaged in illegal behavior, especially violent behavior-is composed dispro-
portionately of poor persons and members of racial minority groups. See, e.g.,
Clark & Wenninger, Socio-Economic Class and Area as Correlates of Illegal Be-
havior among Juveniles, 27 Am. Soc. REv. 826 (1962); Miller, Lower Class Culture
as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency, 14 J. Soc. IssuEs 5 (No. 3 1958).
These people are less likely to wield political influence than are potential crime
victims. The resulting incentive structure for police produces a "combat" orienta-
tion toward crime suspects. See, e.g., H. PAcKEB, TnE Lmrrs OF THm CaMINAL
SA'cioN 332-33 (1968); A. REiss, Tur Porac. AND THE PUBLIC 141-44 (1971).
166Cf. Scherer v. Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.) (holding federal agents
charged with protecting the President immune from suit alleging trespass on private
property), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967).
167 E.g., Posner, supra note 8.
168 See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39
MnN. L. REv. 493, 496-99 (1955); Mashaw, supra note 29, at 28-29.
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defendants in the form of litigation costs.169 Because losing plain-
tiffs as well as successful defendants bear their litigation costs,170
each successful defendant who pays this penalty should be offset by
an official who could have been successfully sued but was not, and
thus was spared litigation costs.
171
Even if the assumptions concerning motivation for suit and
irrelevance of litigation costs are generally merited, there is no
reason to expect them to retain validity for the full run of litigation
against officials. If litigation imposes some costs on defendants
whether they win or lose, might not the desire to impose those
costs on a defendant, rather than to secure financial rewards, moti-
vate some suits? 172 This possibility exists for all types of lawsuits,
but two features of government action may make the initiation of
such "spite" suits against officials peculiarly likely. First, many
government officials are vulnerable to personal suit because they
exercise power over others directly and visibly: the teacher who
suspends a student, 73 the policeman who arrests a suspect,' 74 and
the judge who passes sentence 175 all are clearly identifiable as indi-
169 See Mashaw, supra note 29, at 28.
170 The use of contingent fees to allow sale of part of the plaintiff's claim to
his lawyer does not change the analysis here. Lawyers, of course, will not incur
the litigation costs absent a belief that the probability of success justifies the ex-
penditure.
In litigation under § 1983, and in related actions, there is provision for recovery
of attorney's fees by the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); see Maher
v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). While successful defendants, thus, could be
reimbursed for their costs, the standards for reimbursement of defendant's attorney's
fees are quite stringent, much more so than for plaintiffs. Compare David v.
Travisono, 621 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1980) (per curiam) with United Handicapped
Fed'n v. Andre, 489 F. Supp. 1040, 1048 (D. Minn. 1980).
171 Indeed, under the "American rule" respecting attorney's fees, the defend-
ants generally will not incur any costs unless the plaintiff deems the probability
of success greater than one in two-the defendant pays out the damage award
plus so much of litigation costs as is not publicly underwritten, while the plaintiff
receives only the award minus his attorney's fees. Let P represent the probability
of award, A represent the damage award, and B represent attorney's fees. Holding
these equal for plaintiffs and defendants, suit will be brought when
(P-A)=B>B.
In many cases for which the chance of liability is even, suit will not be brought and
no expenses will be incurred by defendant. This scenario, as stated above, is based
on limiting assumptions respecting the motivation for suit and equality of damage
award and litigation costs for plaintiffs and defendants. For discussion of the
differences between English and American rules respecting award of attorney's fees,
see Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. L-E AL STUn. 399, 437-38 (1973).
172 See Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Col-
lection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970).
173See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
174 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
175 See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
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viduals whose actions operate immediately against a likely com-
plainant. In this respect, these officials differ from a wide array of
employees in other large organizations whose activities, for instance
in the design or manufacture of a given product, might adversely
affect potential plaintiffs. Second, as the examples of official action
just given illustrate, governmental action frequently is coercive in
nature, intruding on individuals who may have resisted contact
with those officials. It is plausible to expect anger directed against
such officials to motivate suit, regardless of likely recovery, more
often than would occur where the user of a commercial product,
having sought contact with the producer, is disappointed with or
injured by it.176
If nonmeritorious suits 177 are brought against government offi-
cials with some frequency, the expected damage penalty calculated
by the courts on the basis of the liability standard, defenses, and
assessed damages may be considerably smaller than the liability in-
centive that in fact will help shape the particular official's conduct.
A liability standard, moderated by a defense of qualified immunity
and by rules limiting damage calculations, and designed to reduce
police incentives to overarrest, might result in a pattern of under-
arrest. If the nonliability incentives to overarrest were weak, and
if the officer is likely to be subject to suit for any arrest, no matter
how clearly within the standard of desirable performance, he may
opt not to arrest in many cases for which the arrest is socially
valued.17
In large measure, the magnitude of the overdeterrence prob-
lem depends on the clarity of the performance standard and the
scope of the official's recognized defense. At one extreme, absolute
immunity reduces the cost of overdeterrence to a minimum. The
official identifies himself as such, and suit against him is dis-
176 Cf. Bell, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 16 HAv.
J. LEcIs. 1, 6 n.22 (1979) (describing some of the cases brought against the
author during his tenure as Attorney General).
177 The term "nonmeritorious" is intended to cover suits that should not result
in liability under a perfect application of the relevant judicial rules. That the costs
of bringing a suit exceed the likely damage award would not render a suit non-
meritorious.
178 See comments by Professors Goetz, Olson, and Shepsle, at Symposium on
Civil Liability of Government Officials, reported as Discussion, 42 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PhoB. 79, 100-14 (Winter 1978). A separate but related problem is pre-
sented by the likelihood that officials will be "risk averse." That is, a given ex-
pected damage penalty including litigation costs will have more impact on official
conduct than is statistically merited because the fear of a great loss will not be
fully discounted by its unlikelihood. See, e.g., R. PosNEt, supra note 141,
§ 4.5, at 76-77 (2d ed. 1977). The various nonliability incentives could be ad-
justed, of course, to offset the impact of risk aversion. For a discussion of both
concerns in a specific context, see Yudof, supra note 29.
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missed. The cost to the defendant, and consequently the harass-
ment value to the plaintiff, is negligible. This is precisely the
reason the Court bars suits against judges and legislators.179 The
Court's treatment of executive officers, however, appears to leave
considerable scope for harassment suits. The official must plead,
and in many jurisdictions prove, both his good faith and general
fidelity to the performance standard.so If the burden of persuasion
is on plaintiff, the vagueness of many performance standards may
make it relatively difficult to demonstrate intent errors as well as
performance errors.' 8' If the defendant must carry this burden,
there is considerable possibility that an official could be found
liable for either intent or performance errors.8 2  In any event,
the imprecision of the standard allows room for costly litigation
over the official's intent and over the legality of his acts.
It is easy to understand the Court's reluctance to make it dif-
ficult to impose sanctions on officials who intentionally or blatantly
abuse their authority, but some of the Court's language exacerbates
what under the best of circumstances may be a difficult problem.
The prospects of overdeterrence would be raised appreciably if
lower courts took seriously the Supreme Court's statement that
officials "should have known" their actions were unlawful (and
therefore will be liable) if those actions violate a constitutional
proscription interpreted previously by the courts or clearly spelled
out in the Constitution: "an act violating a [person's] constitu-
tional rights can be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of
settled, indisputable law . . . than by the presence of actual
malice." 183 The meaning of constitutional provisions, however,
is a source of endless controversy; it is difficult to find any provision
the meaning of which, as applied to a host of different factual set-
179 See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-64 (1978); Tenney v. Brand-
hove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1951).
180 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). See notes 89-90 supra & ac-
companying text.
181 See text accompanying note 123 supra.
182 As Judge Hand recognized in Gregoire, there is always the possibility that
an official operating in good faith within what he reasonably believes to be his
authority will later be found to have acted in bad faith or unreasonably far be-
yond his powers: "it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded
until the case has been tried, and . . . [if his authority is found wanting,] an
official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith."
177 F.2d at 581. The greater the burden on the official-defendant, the more likely
an erroneous judgment against him. For a collection of cases placing on the
official the burden of proving his good faith and reasonable belief in authoriza-
tion, see note 90 supra.
183Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975).
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tings, is made clear by constitutional text, history, or judicial gloss.
Even where a meaning can be made out in judicial pronounce-
ments, it is difficult to believe that officials are conversant with
the myriad opinions, not infrequently conflicting, interpreting con-
stitutional restraints. 84 The Court's statement, hence, must either
provide for liability only in situations that almost never arise or
open officials to potential liability in an incredible array of circum-
stances in which the likelihood of being held answerable in damages
is exceedingly difficult to calculate in advance.1 5 The latter pos-
sibility, if credited, might be sufficient to restrain a great deal of
socially valued conduct.
One argument advanced against giving credence to concerns
about overdeterrence as a result of vexatious litigation is that plain-
tiffs bear the same litigation costs as defendants. 86 Even allowing
that some plaintiffs may be willing to pay to satisfy a taste for
harassment, the more expensive suits become for defendants (thus
increasing overdeterrence problems), the more expensive suits also
become for plaintiffs. Other things being equal, the quantity of
harassing suits should decline as their price to plaintiffs rises.
While the reasoning is sound, the premise is not. First, a success-
ful outcome may not have equal value to both sides, and that will
affect the parties' expenditures. The loss of a suit may cost the
defendant not just the sum paid over to the plaintiff, but also op-
portunities for career advancement on which he places considerably
more value. Second, the investment of time by parties to these
suits may be considerable, and the alternative uses of plaintiffs'
and defendants' time may have strikingly different value. 87 Third,
some classes of plaintiffs may have access to inexpensive legal serv-
ices not available to defendants.8 8 These disparities often hold
18 4 See generally Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 Wm.
& MARY L. REv. 671 (1976).
185 Wood v. Strickland repeats the pattern set by Justice Douglas's plurality
opinion in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), disposing of a similar
issue by narrowly construing the statute at issue (the criminal code analogue to
§ 1983) to avoid constitutional objections, then using broad assumptions to fit the
conduct at bar within the newly narrowed definition of the offense. Compare the read-
ing given to the statute in Screws, 325 U.S. at 101-04 with the Wood Court's con-
struction, 420 U.S. 308, 318-22 (1975). The result is that it is not clear whether
the Justices mean to apply a terribly narrow or terribly broad standard of immunity.
1s See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 29, at 28-29.
187 See Bell, supra note 176.
188 Of course, to the extent suits against officers are defended at government
expense, defense costs no longer are a deterrent to the officer; nor is imposition of
those costs on the officer an inducement to suit. See text accompanying notes
231-37 infra.
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where the plaintiff is a prisoner or an arrestee, two groups with
especially great incentives to vexatious litigation.189
In combination, these distinctions between the litigation cost
incurred by plaintiffs and those imposed on defendants justify con-
siderable concern about overdeterrence even for conduct most
analogous to category two. Although it is difficult to make much
of these figures, the filings against police officers and prison officials
are consistent with the notion that the qualified immunity defense
does not discourage harassing litigation. Legal actions filed by
prisoners alleging violations of constitutional guarantees, for ex-
ample, have increased from less than 2,200 filings in federal district
courts in 1970 to 6,606 in 1975 and 13,000 in 1980, a 491% in-
crease in little more than a decade. 00 The percentage of these suits
that are dismissed is quite high; nonetheless, the number that pro-
ceed to trial is significant, while the instances of liability judgments
against defendants are negligible.1 91 It is possible that many mer-
itorious claims are being dismissed for inartful pleading and that
other meritorious claims are being denied after trial for failure
to clear a too-high burden of persuasion. It is at least equally
plausible, however, that because of frustration, lack of other means
for relief of related grievances, pique, or simply antipathy for
the defendant, many nonmeritorious claims are being brought, con-
suming considerable judicial resources, entailing sizeable defense
costs, yielding few damage awards, but perhaps discouraging some
desirable official conduct.
92
189 See text accompanying notes 172-76 supra.
19 0 A)NmisTRAEw OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CoURs, 1979 ANNUAL
REPORT OF Tm DIRECTOR Table 21, at 61; ADmusmsn.TrvE OFFICE OF =aE UNrnm
STATES COURTS, 1980 AounAL REPORT OF = DmECTOR Table 21, at 62. In
comparison, all civil filings increased 93% during this same period, a rate of
growth less than one-fifth that for prisoner's civil rights filings. ADmnsTRATIVE,
OFFICE oF Tm UmTED STATES COURTS, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF =ri DIRECTOR
Table 18, at 58; AnM:muisTRA=nE OFFICE OF THE UNr= STATES COURTS, 1980
ANNUAL REPORT OF THm DIRECTOR Table 19, at 61. See also Turner, When
Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92
HLv. L. REv. 610 (1979). The number of prisoner suits under § 1983 was
only 218 in 1966, the first year for which such statistics were kept. Id. 611;
AnmmcIsTRa~m OFFICE OF THE UNITEI STATES CoUnTs, 1975 ANNUMAL REoRT
OF nRE DmcTrT 207.
191 While the percentage of prison-filed cases that goes to trial is quite low,
see Turner, supra note 190, Appendix B, at 660-63, the number is not insignificant.
A study conducted for the Harvard Law School Center for Criminal Justice exam-
ined a sample of cases from five federal court districts during a 23i-year period and
found that there were eleven trials of prisoner suits based on § 1983 and that, for
trials and hearings, prisoner-filed § 1983 cases in these districts accounted for 44
court days. Id. 616 & n.38, 624 & n.82, Appendix B.
112 See generally Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity
for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889 (1965).
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B. Preventing Overdeterrence: Individual and
Institutional Responses Short of Immunity
Given the opportunity for harassment implicit in the liability-
immunity standards adopted by the Court for executive officers,
it is possible that present rules respecting official liability may
deter desirable, along with undesirable, official conduct sufficiently
to yield net social costs. This potential for overdeterrence, how-
ever, need not automatically be realized. There are numerous
antidotes to overdeterrence that may be taken by individual officials
or by the enterprises for which they work. Insurance is the most
obvious of these.193 If officials are concerned over the threat of
liability, they may be willing to pay a sum certain (and some en-
trepreneur, an insurer, presumably would be willing to collect that
sum from all risk averse officials) to avoid the risk of liability. By
spreading the risk of a large financial loss over a class of similarly
insured officials, insurance would reduce each official's incentives
to avoid activities that might generate liability suits. 94 To the
extent that litigation costs, rather than simply liability, are a con-
cern, insurance could pool the risk of incurring costs in defending
damage suits as well as in satisfying damage judgments.
Insurance, while useful, is not a perfect antidote to rules that
produce a too-high liability incentive. First, to the extent insur-
ance is effective, it may so fully reduce the incentive to avoid lia-
bility-producing (as well as lawsuit-producing) activity that one
simply replaces the imbalance of an overdeterrent liability incen-
tive with the original underdeterrent incentive structure that
prompted formulation of the liability standard. This return from
overdeterrence to underdeterrence (the functional equivalent of
immunity) would be accomplished at the cost of both making lia-
bility determinations and operating the insurance system. And
although insurance theoretically can be structured to achieve a mid-
dle ground, retaining some of the liability incentive's effects while
eliminating the risk of large losses (as "deductibles" and other lim-
iting provisions are designed to do), there are significant practical
barriers to the translation of liability incentives into insurance
policies.195  Insofar as insurers use more easily administrable
193 See Masbaw, supra note 29, at 27.
194 See K. Aimow, Control in Large Organizations, in EssAYIs iN H THEORY
OF R SE-BEARING 223 (1971); Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Prin-
cipal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979).
195 See H. Ross, SETTLED OuT oF CouRT (1970); Blum & Kalven, Ceilings,
Costs, and Compulsion In Auto Compensation Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. BEv.
341.
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classifications as surrogates for identifying activity that should be
penalized, and structure insurance policies to visit some portion of
that penalty on the individual insured, the function actually per-
formed by insurance may diverge greatly from the goals liability
was intended to achieve. 16 The magnitude of this divergence of
the legal rule and the practical result will depend on the ease
with which liability can be determined-the more difficult the de-
termination, the greater the likely difference.
Second, while some officials will purchase insurance, other
officials might prefer to alter their behavior so as to minimize the
risk of suit rather than incur the cost of insurance. To the extent
the Court's rules generate a too-great liability incentive, some of
this avoidance behavior will be socially undesirable although per-
sonally beneficial. The official who is overdeterred by the liability
incentive-an extreme example would be a police officer who refused
to make any arrest on less than near-certain proof of the arrestee's
guilt-may still be overdeterred when insurance is available. Paying
the insurance premiums and acting in a socially desirable manner,
even though such behavior generates some risk that the official will
be sued, may be more costly to the official than engaging in liability
avoidance behavior that has negative social value but that minimizes
the risk of suit.197  The simple availability of insurance to indi-
vidual officials, thus, does not eliminate the need for some other
mechanism to counter overdeterrence. To avoid the problems of
divergence between personal benefit and social value in the face of
a too-great liability incentive, some institutional control is required.
The employing enterprises, of course, are not without means
to remedy departures from optimal behavior generated by fear of
liability. The enterprise can insure its employees against the costs
of liability and/or providing a defense, eliminating the inducement
for employees to alter their behavior in order to avoid the cost of
insuring. It can, without the intermediary, produce the same re-
sult by satisfying the damage judgments against employees and by
subsidizing or providing any necessary defense. Finally, it can
19G See H. Ross, supra note 195, at 233-43; Bombaugh, The Department of
Transportations Auto Insurance Study and Auto Accident Compensation Reform,
71 COLum. L. REv. 207, 214, Table 3 (1971).
197To the extent officials are free to choose between personally and socially
desirable responses, official positions may become relatively more valuable to indi-
viduals who choose the former response than to those who choose the latter. Judge
Hand, in Gregoire, raised a similar point in noting the potential of damage liability
to make official positions more attractive to the irresponsible than to the ordinary
official. 177 F.2d at 581.
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undertake to monitor employee behavior more closely so that lia-
bility incentives do not induce undesirable behavior.
Each of these mechanisms presents some problem. Paying for
the defense of the defendant-employee's choosing, for instance,
could be extremely costly; sued employees would have incentives
to over-invest in their defense.'98 Conversely, actually providing the
defense for employees might not fully counteract overdeterrence if
employees would invest greater resources in their own defense than
are provided or if they remain fearful of losing. A general prob-
lem is that each of the mechanisms that combats overdeterrence
also reduces beneficial deterrence. 199 To prevent this, additional
resources must be expended to structure somewhat more complex
mechanisms: for example, insuring employees except against cer-
tain types of liability or except when employees are determined to
have been at fault to some specified degree, or insuring for less
than the full amount of liability.
20 0
In a private, profit-making enterprise, there is a metric-profits-
that makes this kind of fine tuning of incentives a plausible solution.
An enterprise that pursues the goal of profit maximization will
endeavor to prevent liability rules from affecting employees' con-
duct in ways that reduce profits.201 If an employee is made per-
sonally liable-for example, a designer of airplanes held liable for
injuries and deaths that are caused by insufficiently safe design-
and the employee then is overdeterred from the errors liability was
intended to prevent, the enterprise's profits will be adversely
affected. Overdeterrence here can be identified without great diffi-
culty. Planes that are slower, more costly, less fuel efficient, or
require additional maintenance-all potential responses to increasing
safety-will be less desirable to buyers, other things being equal.
If damage awards measure the injury costs of an activity and the
price paid by buyers measures its benefits, socially optimum ex-
198 Cf. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 27, at 317 (comparing incentives of
owners and managers).
199 See Baxter, supra note 29, at 51.
200 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 27; Stiglitz, Incentives, Risk, and In-
formation: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy, 6 BELL J. ECON. 552 (1975).
Analogous to these efforts are attempts to use different figures for liability and
recovery so that one party is given the right incentive to good behavior and the
other party is given the appropriate incentive to police that behavior. See Becker
& Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J.
LEGAL Siuo. 1 (1974); Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); Polinsky, Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980).
201 See Fama, supra note 27; Jeusen & Meckling, supra note 27; Shavell, supra
note 194.
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penditures on safety will be to the point where an additional dollar
spent in that endeavor (in reduced value of the plane or in increased
costliness of its design and construction) will produce exactly one
dollar reduction in the expected damage penalty.20 2 Such behavior
would be synonymous with profit maximization where the enter-
prise is liable. Making the employee liable does not change the
calculus. The airplane manufacturer should respond by insuring
the employee, assuming liability, monitoring his behavior, and so
on, to the point where the cost of such additional expenditures
exactly equals the gain of producing more highly valued planes.
20 3
This is, in fact, the way such enterprises have reacted to instances
of potential employee liability.
204
The response of profit-making private enterprises to potentially
overdeterring liability rules for employees reaches the socially de-
sirable outcome despite the fact that corporations, like governmental
entities, are composed of a variety of individuals with disparate
personal interests0 5 The differences among the interests of cor-
porate employees, directors, and stockholders have been thought
sufficient to require some legal protection for the last of these
groups, although their community of interest has been deemed
sufficient to severely limit the scope of legal remedies. 206  Recent
discussion of these enterprises has identified a variety of devices that
operate to reduce the disparity of individual interests within the
corporation and to induce the individuals comprising the corpora-
tion to act in a fashion that promotes their joint interest.20 7  The
widespread practice of giving key managerial personnel ownership
202 See P. SAMUELsoN, supra note 118, at 495-98.
203 See Baxter, supra note 29, at 49-52; Fama, supra note 27; Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 27.
204 See Baxter, supra note 29, at 49; Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tort-
feasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STU. 517 (1980). See also Conard,
A Behavioral Analysis of Directors" Liability for Negligence, 1972 DUKE L.J. 895.
205 See, e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 Am. EcoN. REv. 777 (1972); Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and
Observability, 10 BELL J. EcoN. 74 (1979); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 27.
206 See, e.g., Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. Bv. 1,
39 n.124 (1977) (discussing the "business judgment" rule).
207 See Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FnANcE 383 (1970); Jensen, Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence,
3 BELL J. EcoN. & MANAGEMENT Scr. 357 (1972); Manne, Mergers and the Mar-
ket for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110 (1965). But see Grossman &
Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation,
11 BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980). A recent argument that laws have reduced the
benefit of takeovers is in Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and
State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 371 (1980). See also
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HAuv. L. REv. 1161 (1981).
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interests in the corporation, for example, is one mechanism by
which managers' and stockholders' interests are made more con-
gruent. 08 Given these harmonizing devices, liability rules for
corporations or corporate employees are likely to reach socially
valued results if the entity or any of its component members is in
a position to respond to the liability rule efficiently. The courts
need not ascertain which among the various possible defendants
can efficiently respond to the liability rule; so long as one of them
can, they are likely to reach the appropriate outcome through a
process of implicit or explicit bargaining once liability is imposed
on any of the defendants.
C. Institutional Responses to Overdeterrence: The Special
Case of Governmental Enterprises
Governmental enterprises, however, are less likely than private,
profit-making entities to respond appropriately when one of their
employees is subject to an overdeterrent liability constraint. Three
different but related reasons impair the governmental response.
First, governmental enterprises lack the kind of clear goal that
profit-making firms enjoy.20 9 Liability may be a desirable means
of forcing private firms to consider costs they might otherwise
ignore, but with or without liability the joint goal of the firm
members is to maximize profits. The efficient response to liability
for the firm (irrespective of the efficiency of the liability rules) is
the response consistent with profit maximization. 210 There is, how-
ever, no similar, easily stated goal for government. The "members"
of any governmental enterprise (the citizenry of the relevant juris-
diction and the officials employed by it) may want very different
goals pursued. Attempts to define an ideal for government in-
evitably meet a host of objections.
21
1
208 See, e.g., Fama, supra note 27; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 27; Shavell,
supra note 194.
209 Almost any discussion of what government should do demonstrates this
point. See, e.g., J. RIwLs, A THEoRY OF JUSTICE (1971). Efforts to assess gov-
ernment performance by reference to a single principle, see Coase, The Market for
Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 Am. EcoN. REv. 384 (1974); Director, The
Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1964), have not been
endorsed widely by academics nor embraced by public officials. Whatever the
appeal of these efforts, they cannot be taken as statements of the accepted measure
of good government.
210 See Baxter, supra note 29, at 48-49.
211 See discussion of J. RAwLs, supra note 209, in Feldman, Book Review, 61
CALIw. L. REv. 1463 (1973); MacIntyre, Book Review, 52 B.U.L. REV. 330 (1972);
McBride, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 980 (1972); Narveson, A Puzzle About
Economic Justice in Rawis" Theory, 4 Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 1 (1976).
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Second, even if we could identify a goal for government, there
would be considerable difficulty determining whether the goal was
accomplished.2 12 The existence of markets for the purchase and
sale of private firms' products and of the ownership interests in
those firms provides a useful yardstick for the firm's success. If I
own stock of an airplane manufacturer, the change in stock prices
and return in dividends give me relatively easy measures of manage-
ment's performance; the prices buyers will pay for their planes and
for their competitors' planes together with the costs of design and
production give management a useful indication of the strengths
and weaknesses of the firm's product. Governmental enterprises, in
contrast, seldom produce products that are evaluated by a market-
place where they compete with other, similar products.
Third, the control mechanisms available to members of a gov-
ernmental enterprise to regulate the conduct of other members are
less useful than the control mechanisms available in a private firm.
In part this reflects the greater difficulty of identifying a goal and
evaluating performance in the government context. It also results
from differences in how one becomes a member of the enterprise.
If I own stock in a corporation, I may lack direct control over the
corporation's management in any meaningful sense, but I can sell
my stock if the investment is not satisfactory. If my perception of
management's inadequacy is shared by others, stock prices will
decline and other managers will be alerted to the likelihood that
additional profits (for both stockholders and managers) could be had
from improved management. Ultimately, stock sales provide the
vehicle for a credible threat that poorly performing managers will
be replaced.213  The private firm's managers, in turn, have a set
of useful control devices at their disposal to ensure adequate per-
formance by other employees. Managers generally have consider-
able freedom to replace personnel or alter work methods if the
firm's products do poorly in the market or if market success comes
at too steep a price.
Neither "owners" nor "managers" have control mechanisms
of quite the same force in governmental firms. Citizens dissatisfied
with government performance can move away from the jurisdiction
or they can vote to remove elected officials from office. Moving,
especially if one is reacting to federal policies, is a poor parallel
to selling one's stock. Voting, too, is a very imperfect means for
212 See, e.g., A. DowNs, AN EcoNoMuc THEoRY OF DEMoCmAcY 207-37 (1957).
213 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 207; Hetherington & Dooley, supra
note 206, at 39-40; Manne, supra note 207.
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registering a citizen's preferences. Because the citizen may have
no single, overarching interest in an official's conduct (something
akin to profit maximization), but instead has a number of discrete
interests related to different issues, voting for or against an official
who has addressed many issues over the past two, four, or six years
of his term requires the citizen to balance the decisions he feels
were detrimental against those he feels were beneficial.214 The
official, however, does not learn from the vote which decisions were
approved and which were disapproved by the voter. On matters
of intense interest, then, a citizen may wish to express his views to
elected officials more directly. Lobbying and the various expres-
sions of interest associated with it-for example, promises of cam-
paign contributions or voter support in exchange for a favorable
position on the particular issue-may therefore play a more im-
portant role than voting in shaping official incentives respecting
particular issues. 215  But the cost of aggregating small interests to
underwrite lobbying efforts may prevent the expression of some
views in this manner and give officials a distorted picture of voters'
preferences. When this happens, there can be "takeover" bids by
another candidate or party that believes it has identified a defect
in the incumbent's positions sufficiently grave that the coalition of
interests he has responded to will be inadequate to secure his re-
election.216 This only completes the circle since the takeover must
be at election time and, if successful, the new "managers" must be
informed by the same sort of very imperfect information that in-
itially informed the incumbent.
The elected officials who serve as managers for the enterprise
also have more cumbersome tools than their private-sector counter-
parts for controlling other employees. At first blush, the differ-
ence may seem slight. Most public employees are subject to a wide
range of inducements to good behavior and sanctions for bad be-
havior, including job termination or transfer, promotion or demo-
tion, and changes in pay and perquisites. 217  The government's
214 The citizen also must evaluate, on the basis of a similar balancing, the
gain that might be obtained from election of the incumbent's opponent. See J.
Bucm&NA & G. TULLOCK, supra note 131, at 211-31; A. DowNs, supra note 212,
at 36-50, 207-37.
215 See, e.g., A. DowNs, supra note 212, at 90-95; V. RIKER & P. ORDESHOO]K,
supra note 131, at 71-74, 333-36.
216 See A. DowNs, supra note 212, at 23-33, 96-139; Lau & Frey, Ideology,
Public Approval, and Government Behavior, 10 PUB. CHoIcE 21 (1971); Stigler,
supra note 130, at 94-97.
217See, e.g., A. DowNs, INstaE BUaAUCRAcY 81-87 (1967); Auster, Some
Economic Determinants of the Characteristics of Public Workers in EcoNomics OF
PUBLc CHOICE 185 (R. Leiter & A. Sirkin eds. 1975). One constraint that
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managers, however, have not been given a free hand to use these
measures to reward good, and punish bad, behavior. Rather, a
complex set of restrictions, most notably the civil service laws,
limits the usefulness of these measures as vehicles for shaping offi-
cial action either to the public's benefit or to its detriment.218
These restrictions on hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, and
other personnel actions were not adopted because these means of
controlling employee behavior are needed less in the public than
in the private sector to give employees appropriate incentives to
desirable behavior. The restrictions were adopted because the
managers controlling such decisions were not trusted to use them
to advance socially valued, as opposed to personally desired, be-
havior. That mistrust follows from the difficulties of defining
and recognizing socially desirable governmental action and, hence,
of structuring managers' incentives to attain it. It would seem
quite odd if the charter of a profit-making enterprise limited the
chief executive officer's control over personnel decisions, divided
authority among three officers for decisions respecting the purchase
of materials and the manufacture and distribution of products, and
insulated each of the officers from interference by the others in his
area of decisionmaking authority. Corporations are not structured
in this manner because investors know what goal they want pur-
sued, agree on the goal, can observe whether it is attained, and can
extricate themselves from involvement at reasonably low cost if it
bears special mention is the possibility of criminal sanctions. Considerable attention
has focused in recent years on the application of criminal penalties to acts of
government officials. The "Watergate" cases, see, e.g., United States v. Ehrlichman,
376 F. Supp. 29 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1120 (1977), are perhaps the best known instances of the imposition of
criminal penalties to official acts. These are, however, unusual. The very severity of
criminal sanctions that makes them useful to combat egregious official conduct also
raises the spectre of overdeterrence. In place of a credible threat of prosecution
for intent or performance errors, prosecutors have followed a strategy that provides
scant possibility of overdeterrence by providing no significant possibility of prose-
cution. Aside from occasional cases involving bribery, extortion, and the like,
prosecutors have seldom taken action against public officials. It is difficult to know
to what extent failure to prosecute reflects the fact that the prosecutor and likely
defendant often share a boss, such as in the case of the federal government, which
places both the U.S. attorneys and the F.B.I. under the Attorney Ceneral. What-
ever the cause, the result of an insignificant prosecution rate is a potential not so
much for vexatious litigation as for inconsistent application of criminal laws. The
likely case for imposition of criminal penalties is either a dramatic shift in the
view of certain activities over time (as arguably occurred in recent prosecutions of
former F.B.I. officials) or a great difference in the constituencies of a prosecutor
and defendant-official (as in federal prosecutions of local officials). In all events,
the criminal sanction will not be viewed as a realistic constraint on most official
conduct at the time it occurs.
218 See generally R. VAUGHN, TnE SPoMEn SYS= (1975); Merrill, Proce-
dures for Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. tnv. 196 (1973).
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is not. Although there is, doubtless, some room for self-interested
conduct by the private firm's managers, they can be trusted to
make most decisions free from direct constraint-the necessity to
produce profits serves as an effective check on most managerial
conduct.219 In contrast, our whole structure of government is
oriented to limiting and dividing official authority.2 0 The con-
stitutionally mandated separation of powers among different gov-
ernmental branches, as well as the host of subsidiary restraints on
various officials, reflects the disbelief in our ability to give any
official appropriate incentives to act in a manner that promotes the
joint interests of all the enterprises' "members."
While the universal imperfection of official incentives provides
the obvious impetus for liability, it also provides reason for caution
in liability decisions. Because official incentives are imperfect,
there always will be official errors that damage penalties might
seem useful to remedy. At the same time, there is a likelihood
that the socially ideal level of liability will not be found and that
departures from the ideal will not be fully corrected by other mech-
anisms. Because judges, too, have imperfect incentives, they may
err in striving to correct other officials' mistakes. Where judges
believe that other officials have underestimated the cost of their
actions in terms of harm to constitutionally derived values (such
as freedom of speech or guarantees against unreasonable searches
or seizures), officials from other branches may believe, equally
rightly, that the judges have undervalued the benefit of the official
conduct under review (in terms, perhaps, of public safety and health
or of relief from financial burdens).2 21 Indeed, section A of this
part demonstrated that the Court's qualified immunity decisions
might have underestimated the impact of liability on officials.
222
Moreover, the difficulty of defining a goal for government, of
recognizing success or failure in its accomplishment, and of structur-
219 See Dooley, supra note 28.
22 0 See THE FEDERAiaST Nos. 47, 51 (J. Madison).
221 Criticism of the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, on such grounds is
not hard to find. See, e.g., A. BicKEL, THE SuPRnmxm CoURT AND THE IDEA oF
PoGRxss (1970); P. KusAND, POLrrIcs, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN
CouRT (1970). The very imprecision of the Constitution, however, ensures such
differences. Lord Macaulay's observation on the American Constitution more than
a century ago is apt: "It has one drawback-it is all sail and no anchor." Letter
from Lord Macaulay to H.S. Randall (May 23, 1857), quoted in Cinderella
Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
and again in Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on
Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 177 (1978), whence it came to my
attention.
2 22 See notes 165-92 supra & accompanying text.
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ing incentives to that end inhibits the correction of socially in-
correct liability rules. Professor Coase demonstrated that in a
world of zero transaction costs an incorrect liability rule would not
affect attainment of the socially efficient allocation of resources. 223
The doctor and baker in Coase's hypothetical agree to reach the
highest-valued use of their adjacent properties whether the baker
is or is not liable for the interference with the doctor's business by
his noisy machines. 2 4  The doctor represents fully society's inter-
est in his use of the one property, the baker represents fully so-
ciety's interest in his use of the other property, and there is no
impediment to them striking a bargain that, in turn, fully represents
society's interest in the use of both properties. The problems posed
by liability rules for government officials differ strikingly from this
hypothetical. At the outset, government officials do not fully rep-
resent society's interests in their particular activity. Consider the
municipal police officer whose sole duty is to identify and arrest
felony suspects. Does the police officer represent society's interest
in arresting suspects and thus deterring crime? Does he represent
society's interest in not stigmatizing or interfering with the liberty
of persons who in fact have not committed crimes? Or does the
,chief of police represent society's interest in the first, and the city
council society's interest in the second?
It seems plain that officials may represent more of one interest
than another (the category two analogue) or they may represent a
relatively balanced set of interests (the category three analogue),
but they are not likely to represent fully any of society's interests.
If all of the individuals in a community could reveal the value
they place on having a suspect arrested when evidence indicates a
probability between 51% and 67% that he committed a crime,
and they offered a dollar equivalent of that value to official A to
produce that result; and if all potential suspects likewise fixed a
sum that represents the value to them of freedom from arrest on
evidence indicating less than a 67% probability of criminality, and
they offered a dollar equivalent of that value to official B to pro-
.duce that result; and if all of this could be done costlessly, negotia-
tions between A and B should result in agreement to produce the
socially desirable amount of arresting. Unfortunately, the costs of
identifying and acting on society's interest in either side of this
equation are prohibitive. Very imperfect information about these
values may be conveyed in city council elections. City council
223 See Coase, supra note 117, at 1-15.
224 Id. 2-10.
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members may attempt to instruct the chief of police, and to struc-
ture his various employment incentives, to reflect this information
The police chief then may do the same in trying to structure his
lieutenants' employment incentives, and so on down to the police
officer who must decide when to arrest.
At each point, however, the difficulty of determining the ap-
propriate level of arrests leaves room for deviation from that ideal.
How will the police lieutenant or sergeant, much less the city
council members, know if police officers are failing to arrest sus-
pects who ought to be arrested? Unlike the case of an arrest that
is made when it ought not to be, there is no ready complainant; 22
and unlike comparison of firms' profit figures, there is no easy
mechanic for comparing arrest figures.2 26 It is, of course, possible
that police want to make arrests for reasons apart from institutional
incentives.227  Faced with liability, the police officers may demand
protection equivalent to immunity so that they will not have to
alter their arresting behavior. If higher-ranking officials believe
that liability rules will result in too little arresting, they may press
this demand on the city council. And if the council members be-
lieve this, they may agree to pay for the police officers' defense, to
hold them harmless from liability for arrest, and so on.
The point here is not that actions of this nature do not occur
in governmental enterprises. Rather, the point is that they are
less likely than in the hypothetical posed by Professor Coase or in
the case of private, profit-making firms to result in the socially de-
sirable amount of correction. It is possible that a liability rule's
overdeterrence (here, underarrest) will go undetected. If the per-
sonally beneficial response to liability for police is, in whole or in
part, a too great reduction in arresting, the impediments to com-
municating this perception to the relevant officials may prevent
them from becoming aware of the problem, even if it is perceived
225 Two recent efforts to devise legal remedies for situations such as this do
not address the sizable causation problem that may prevent someone who is in fact
harmed from discovering or proving the link to official action. See Note, Police
Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 HAnv. L. REv. 821 (1981);
Note, Holding Governments Strictly Liable for the Release of Dangerous Parolees,
55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 907 (1980). Beneath that problem lies the more general diffi-
culty of assessing the increase in risk to others (and of deciding what step to take
with respect to risk-creation) where no causal link to harm can be proved. See
Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theonj,
80 COLuM. L. REv. 1399 (1980).
226 Cf. N. Moumrs & G. HAwKINs, Tnm HoNEsr PoLrricL's GUIDE To CMIE
CommoL 31-34 (1970) (criticizing the currently available crime statistics).
227Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (requiring timely judicial de-
termination of probable cause following arrest); L. KATZ, JusTicE is TE Cnvrm
51-62 (1972) (examining effects of pretrial delay).
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by members of the public in general.228 If aware of the problem,
those officials may be insufficiently rewarded for its correction to
take significant steps to that end. The members of the city council,
for instance, may derive as much personal benefit from merely
issuing a public directive to increase arrests as they would from
actually increasing arrests to the optimal level.229  If the police
chief does not really believe the council members are concerned
with the level of arrests, or are only mildly and temporarily con-
cerned, he may seek funds from the council for projects of im-
portance to him though only pretextually related to the overdeter-
rence problem-funds could be used, for instance, to finance a
relatively elaborate undercover operation that would be exciting
to supervise.
230
It is difficult to predict in any instance whether the government
officials ultimately responsible will undercorrect or overcorrect in
response to liability rules for government officers; any empirical
efforts to ascertain which response is adopted face the same problems
of definition and evaluation of the socially desirable result that
citizens and officials encounter. Given positive costs to securing
action from the ultimate official arbiters and the difficulty of de-
tecting some "shirking" activity (like non-arrest), however, under-
correction frequently will be the more plausible response. As just
acknowledged, that supposition is not provable, and examination
of the actions governments have in fact taken in response to in-
creasing numbers of suits against officials sheds little light on this.
One striking feature of these responses is that no jurisdiction has
acted to grant blanket immunity to officials and few have granted
immunity for an easily identified class of actions or officers. 231
22
8 See text accompanying notes 214-16 supra. See also Lindsay, A Theory
of Government Enterprise, 84 ]. POL. ECON. 1061 (1976) (describing differences
between the public and private sectors based in part on the difficulty of com-
municating certain information to officials).
229 See, e.g., 28 Precinct Chiefs Are Told To Battle Rise in Robberies, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1980, § B, at 3, col. 5. The mayor's directive was given consider-
able publicity. I am not aware, however, of any subsequent action by the mayor
-or alteration of the robbery rates.
230A series of relatively recent, highly-publicized operations of this sort-the
D.C. Police "Sting" and "Got Ya Again" operations and the F.B.I.'s "ABSCAM"
operation-lend some credence to this possibility. See, e.g., Gillers, In Defense of
ABSCAM: Entrapment, Where is Thy Sting? 230 NAnoN 203 (1980); Wall St. J.,
Mar. 9, 1976, at 20, col. 1; Wash. Post, Jul. 14, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
2 3 1 Two bills that would have had this effect died in committee during the
past two Congresses. S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 CoNG. Buc. S2920
(daily ed. Mar. 15, 1979); S. 2117, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). A more lim-
ited provision for federal law enforcement officers was enacted as the intentional
tort amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976)).
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While most jurisdictions have provided some mechanism for de-
fraying the explicit costs of defending damage actions and reim-
bursing officials for adverse judgments, 232 most states make both
payment of (or reimbursement for) defense costs and reimbursement
for adverse judgments turn on a determination by a designated
government officer or entity that the official-defendant acted in good
faith and within the scope of his employment (or some variant of
this formula).23 3 That test duplicates the Scheuer v. Rhodes quali-
fied immunity standard.234 Were the standard interpreted uni-
formly by courts and the officers or agencies deciding when to pay
defense costs or judgments, the result would be to allow for re-
imbursement only where there would be no adverse judgment.2 5
Payment of defense costs for nonliable officials still will be of value
to potential defendants. But not all states go even this far. Some
states refuse to reimburse sued employees who have insured against
liability actions,23 and some states still require private bills from
232 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.065-.07 (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 127, §§ 1301-1302 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§75.6101-.6116 (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. §3.736, subd. 9 (West Supp. 1980);
OHro REv. CODE ANN. §§9.87, 109.36-.366 (Page Supp. 1980); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN-. §5110(c) (Purdon Supp. 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §5311.303
(Purdon Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. §§165.25(6), 895.46 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
See also Bell, supra note 176, at 7-9; Bermann, supra note 29, at 1190-94. The
federal government to date lacks explicit statutory basis for insuring or defend-
ing officials, although the latter practice has been justified under the general
language of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92, ch. 20, §35 (1789) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. §516 (1976)), authorizing litigation of "civil actions in
which the United States shall be concerned." See Bell, supra note 176, at 3
n.6, 7-8 & n.25. The federal government does indemnify officials for judgments
paid out in connection with a limited number of activities, or where the govern-
ment and official have been found jointly liable, but generally indemnification is
not available. See Bermann, supra note 29, at 1191-92.
233 See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 127, § 1302(b)-(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979)
(attorney general must determine that the employee acted within the scope of
his employment and that intentional, willful, or wanton misconduct was not
involved); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6108 (Supp. 1980) (exceptions where act was
not within scope of employment or was motivated by malice); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143-300.4 (1977) (government or private attorney provided if the attorney gen-
eral determines, inter alia, that the challenged act was within the scope of the
defendant's employment duties and did not constitute an intentional wrong);
OHro 1rv. CODE ANN. §§9.87(B), 109.362(B)(2), (E)(1) (Page Supp. 1980)
(attorney general (defense) or employer (indemnification) must ascertain if the
act was within the scope of defendant's employment and taken in good faith,
without malicious purpose); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§4.92.060-.070 (Supp.
1980) (attorney general must find employee's acts to be in good faith and within
the scope of his official duties).
234 See notes 82-95 supra & accompanying text.
235 One can expect, however, that state officials and agencies might apply the
standard in a manner more favorable to officials than the courts will.
2 36 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 12B (Supp. 1980); OHmo REV. CODE ANN.
§§9.87(B)(1), 109.362(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1980); S.C. CODE §1-7-60 (1976).
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the legislature to recompense officials.237  It is plausible that this
very tempered reaction represents an inadequate response to what
probably has been too great an increase in the liability incentive
faced by executive officials. Whatever conclusions one draws about
undercorrection or overcorrection, however, it is relatively pre-
dictable that mechanisms for limiting the impact of expected
damage penalties that are too high will not be employed to the
optimal extent by governmental enterprises nearly so often as by
enterprises with better defined goals and stronger incentives for
managers to attain them.
In combination, the potential for judicial decisions on official
excuse from liability to overdeter even official action for which
liability is at least presumptively useful (category two activity) and
the possible defects in the institutional response of government to
such overdeterrence indicate that courts may often be faced with
the choice articulated by Learned Hand three decades ago: to deny
damage liability for many official errors (intent as well as perform-
ance errors) or to risk the inducement of some new errors by a
liability incentive intended to correct the errors now perceived to
exist.238 Given present abilities to describe and to attain ideals for
government conduct, it is extraordinarily difficult to use damage
liability to fine tune official incentives so that substantially all errors
imposing demonstrable harm on identifiable individuals are pre-
vented without inducing a substantial number of opposed errors,
although these may impose a less easily observed harm on a less
easily identified group. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in part in
Butz v. Economou, scored the majority on just this point:
History will surely not condemn the Court for its
effort to achieve a more finely ground product from the
judicial mill, a product which would both retain the
necessary ability of public officials to govern and yet assure
redress to those who are the victims of official wrongs.
But if such a system of redress for official wrongs was
indeed capable of being achieved in practice, it surely
would not have been rejected by this Court speaking
through the first Mr. Justice Harlan in 1896, by this Court
237 See Letter from Robert S. Stubbs II, Executive Assistant Attorney General
of Georgia (April 21, 1980); Letter from C. Tolbert Goolsby, Jr., Deputy Attorney
General of South Carolina (April 22, 1980); Letter from Robert B. Littleton,
Deputy Attorney General of Tennessee (April 24, 1980) (letters on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
23SGregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 949 (1950).
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speaking through the second Mr. Justice Harlan in 1959,
and by Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1948 [sic]. These judges
were not inexperienced neophytes who lacked the vision
or the ability to define immunity doctrine to accomplish
that result had they thought it possible. Nor were they
obsequious toadies in their attitude toward high-ranking
officials of coordinate branches of the Federal Government.
But they did see with more prescience than the Court does
today, that there are inevitable trade-offs in connection
with any doctrine of official liability and immunity. They
forthrightly accepted the possibility that an occasional
failure to redress a claim of official wrongdoing would
result from the doctrine of absolute immunity which they
espoused viewing it as a lesser evil than the impairment of
the ability of responsible public officials to govern.
239
V. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: AN ALTERNATIVE CONTROL
In parts III and IV, it was assumed that some mechanism for
compensation of persons harmed by official misconduct would be
available if individual officers were immune. A variety of mech-
anisms, other than individual officer liability, could compensate
individuals for harm. Individuals could insure against the harm;
government could provide an administrative vehicle for compen-
sation, or government could pay damages pursuant to a judicial
determination of liability. The last of these alternatives is ex-
amined briefly in this part and is compared to official liability as a
means of controlling officials' behavior.
A. The Mechanics of Enterprise Liability
To the extent compensation is embraced as a goal,240 enterprise
liability has an obvious advantage over official liability: the govern-
mental enterprise is much more likely than the individual officer to
have the funds required to satisfy a judgment.241  The difficult
question is whether the increase in compensation under enterprise
2 39 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 529 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
240 See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23 (1980); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974).
241 See Bermann, supra note 29; Davis, supra note 29.
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liability would be accompanied by an increase or decrease in socially
desirable official behavior. Two aspects of this question are ad-
dressed in this section: how does enterprise liability provide in-
centives to better behavior, and what impact might a change in
defendant from individual to entity have on frequency of suit, the
component of liability incentive least subject to judicial control?
In one sense, enterprise liability operates in exact opposition
to official liability. The latter provides officers an incentive to
modify their behavior (for better or for worse from society's stand-
point depending on the courts' ability to provide a liability incen-
tive of the correct quantum) except insofar as other officials act to
alter that incentive (by paying for defense costs, for adverse judg-
ments, etc.). Enterprise liability, in contrast, only provides officials
an incentive to modify their behavior insofar as other officials
choose to require. Put differently, where official liability acts im-
mediately upon the officer whose conduct is at issue, enterprise lia-
bility generally acts only mediately upon that officer. He need not
pay for defense of the suit nor must he pay any adverse judgment.
The official in all likelihood will be required to invest some time
in the suit (conferring with representatives for the defense, giving
testimony, and so on) and may suffer personal embarrassment from
a judgment adverse to the government based on a finding that his
conduct was improper. These may, of themselves, prove sig-
nificant incentives to avoid conduct that could give rise to such
suits or at least to adverse judgments. By and large, however, these
effects seem trivial in comparison with those triggered by official
liability, where the individual's purse as well as his ego are directly
at issue. The more significant deterrent effect of enterprise lia-
bility is likely to come from a restructuring of incentives within
the governmental enterprise. If administrative sanctions, including
shifting liability and defense costs back to the employee, requiring
insurance, or disciplining the employee, are imposed against officials
whose conduct generates additional costs for the government, or if
additional monitoring burdens are incurred by the enterprise to
prevent imposition of higher costs in defense of lawsuits and pay-
ment of damage awards, these measures are likely to provide the
principal incentives to alter official behavior.
In theory, these secondary incentives from enterprise liability
could result in greater deterrence than official liability, less deter-
rence, or the same deterrence. The general imperfection of official
incentives to engage in socially valued behavior, discussed in the
preceding section, precludes an assumption that enterprise liability
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generally will induce the appropriate response.242 If the relevant
officials decide to penalize conduct that imposes defense costs on the
enterprise, whether or not that conduct is found to be improper,
the same possibility for overdeterrence discussed in part IV will
exist. And if the administrative penalties adopted are regarded by
officials as a more severe sanction that the monetary costs of the suits'
defense, enterprise liability could produce a greater likelihood of
overdeterrence than official liability.
While it is extremely difficult to predict what the governmental
response will be in any given instance, a general pattern of under-
deterrence seems a more plausible result than does overdeterrence.
The initial effect of enterprise liability is the expenditure of public
monies. These may come from a general fund or from an alloca-
tion to a specific bureau. Payment from a general fund requires
that the initial step for altering behavior of the erring officer be
taken by someone even further removed from that office than the
bureau head; otherwise, the same analysis applies. If the bureau
that employs the erring official provides the funds to pay for de-
fense of lawsuits and for liability judgments, the person most im-
mediately affected will be the head of that bureau. While each
member of the bureau may suffer a reduction in bureau expendi-
tures that benefit him personally, the whole amount of the judg-
ment is subtracted from the funds that the bureau head has some
discretion to allocate. There is considerable evidence that high-
level officials are concerned about the budget for their bureaus and
consistently attempt to secure larger budgets.2 3 Since liability
expenditures in the short run reduce the amount of money avail-
able to be spent by the affected bureau, the bureau head is likely
to attempt to protect his budget against liability costs. This can
be done by seeking budget increases to cover liability expenses, by
altering employees' behavior to reduce liability expenses, or by
some combination of these actions.
Assuming that some effort will be made to reduce the bureau's
liability costs, the extent of that effort will depend on the relative
importance attached by the bureau head to the activity that gen-
erates liability and to the avoidance of the liability expense. The
higher up an official, the greater the importance he is likely to
242 See Baxter, supra note 29, at 51. This assumption, however, can be made
for profit-maximizing firms. Id. But see Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability
in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980) (arguing that some
exceptions to this generally valid assumption should be recognized).
243 See generally W. NISxANEmN, supra note 159; Posner, The Behavior of Ad-
ninistrative Agencies, 1 J. LEGAr. STUD. 305 (1972).
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attach to both.244 The chief of police, therefore, may be more con-
cerned about reducing crime rates and about protecting the depart-
ment's budget than the individual officer. Just as he loses more
from a reduction in the department's budget, so, too, he gains a
much greater share of the rewards that attach to achievement of
the bureau's goals. If the individual police officer had systematically
imbalanced institutional incentives to arrest in a nonliability world,
the likely reason would be that his superior officers (and beyond
them, the elected managers of government) believed the cost im-
posed on suspects wrongly arrested was outweighed by the benefit
of a vigorous arrest policy. The court's judgment that there should
be liability for the arrest indicates a different evaluation of these
costs than is arrived at through the processes of the other two
branches. To the extent officials in the other branches disagree,
they may be willing to tolerate some level of liability costs in order
to prevent interference with the underlying activity. 245 Assuming
that the court has identified the socially correct performance stand-
ard, then, the same incentives that caused managers and their em-
ployees to deviate from the social optimum in a world without
liability would cause them to underdeter official errors when enter-
prise liability (but not officer liability) is imposed.
In assessing the likely response to enterprise liability, however,
any extrapolation from a nonliability world must be made with
considerable reticence. One reason that enterprise liability prob-
ably will alter officials' incentives is that the group burdened by
departure from the socially desirable may well change-the group
harmed by too many arrests, for example, is not coextensive with
the group of taxpayers who must pay liability judgments against
the enterprise. In a nonliability world, the arrestees bear the cost
of suboptimal official conduct. In an enterprise liability world,
the arrestees (theoretically) will be fully compensated for the harm
imposed on them, and the cost of suboptimal conduct will shift
to taxpayers. If the latter group has fewer impediments than the
former to communicating with government's managers and to re-
244 See Achian & Demsetz, supra note 205; Fama, supra note 27; Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 27. Although "superiors" will be aware of the divergence
between group interests and personal interests of individual subordinates, and will
take steps to reduce its impact, see Fama, supra note 27, the additional costs
necessary to reduce the effect of divergent interests means that, after all efficient
adjustments have been made, lower-echelon employees still would have interests
farther from the joint or social interest than higher-ranking persons.
246 For a discussion of the different notions of social value likely from the
judicial and other branches, see Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Su-
preme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279 (1957).
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warding them for acting in a manner consistent with the group's
wishes, it is reasonable to expect an increased effort by government's
managers to reduce the arresting activity that courts consider unde-
sirable once liability is imposed.
While the imposition of liability on the enterprise thus should
lead to changes in the behavior of government's managers, two
caveats are in order. First, if the monetary costs of liability are
spread over a large number of taxpayers, causing only a very slight
increase in the tax burden on each, any incentive to ascertain the
cause of the increase and to take steps to limit it may for most
taxpayers be less than the cost of doing so.2 46 Again, the problem of
high transaction costs for diffuse groups with low individual interest
prevents the translation of a substantial group interest into equally
substantial incentives for government's managers.247  Second, the
structure of government makes the translation of incentives faced
by higher-level officials into similar incentives for lower-level officials
difficult. As elaborated in part IV, the translation occurs, but fre-
quently something is lost in the translation.2 8  Given positive costs
to restructuring official incentives, it probably is unrealistic to
expect an adjustment of each individual official's incentives that
fully reflects the enterprise liability costs his actions generate.2 49
A reasonable guess, then, is that, whereas officer liability may lead
to overdeterrence, enterprise liability will result in underdeterrence,
but not in so much underdeterrence as prevails in the absence of
any liability.
If, as posited above, liability results in some underdeterrence
of official misconduct, and official liability results in overdeterrence,
which is to be preferred? Although the basis of choosing between
them is slim, there is one reason to believe that the level of under-
deterrence from enterprise liability may be less than the over-
deterrence possible with official liability. The signal provided to
other officials by misconduct that results in enterprise liability is a
clear one: the judicial process has valued the harm from what it has
identified as misconduct at a specific dollar amount. In contrast,
246 See J. BucsaANAN & G. TuLLocx, supra note 131, at 143-44; Stigler, supra
note 125, at 10-12.
2 4 7 See authorities cited in notes 214-16 supra.
2 4 8 See text accompanying notes 221-37 supra.
249 Cf. City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2748, 2759-62
(1981) (questioning the deterrent value of enterprise liability and, in part on
that basis, immunizing municipalities from punitive damages in § 1983 suits).
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the signal to other officials that an officer has engaged in socially
undesirable conduct that avoids some risk of liability is much less
clear. ° Because underdeterrence of official errors will result in
official misbehavior that yields too much liability, and overdeter-
rence will produce official misbehavior that yields too little liability,
enterprise liability may produce better incentives for officials than
officer liability, as well as more compensation to persons harmed by
official action.
Yet, even this modest conclusion must be qualified. The
greater capacity for compensation may induce some suits against
the enterprise that would not have been brought against the less
pecunious individual officer. To know whether suits will be
brought with more frequency under one rule than under the other
would require evaluation of the number of nonmeritorious "spite"
suits filed against individual officers, the number of meritorious
suits not filed against judgment-proof officials, and the number of
nonmeritorious "deep pocket" suits filed against enterprises. This
last class of suits might seem small because, by hypothesis, the plain-
tiffs who are motivated by monetary rather than other personal
considerations should be deterred from suit except where there is
at least an even probability that the award will merit the cost of
suit. The costliness of litigation, however, may induce an entity
that frequently is subject to suit to adopt a practice of overcom-
pensatory settlement of small claims.251 Such a practice might
prompt an increase in the number of such claims filed. It therefore
is difficult to predict what the relative frequency of suit under these
alternative liability schemes would be. Indeed, there may be too
much litigation under either scheme. Still, if the likely bias of
official liability is to overdeter and that of enterprise liability is to
underdeter, too great a frequency of suit (although of itself a mis-
allocation of resources) would exacerbate the problem with official
liability's impact on officer's incentives and ameliorate the problem
presented by enterprise liability. Granting the difficulty of assessing
these various effects on official conduct, where official actions are
likely to trigger a significant number of spite suits or where the
imbalance in official incentives is slight, enterprise liability may
entail a lower risk than official liability of substituting incentives
to commit one official error with incentives to commit another.
2ZoCf. Holmstrom, supra note 205, at 83-89 (discussing the notion of a
valuable signal and the value of imperfect information).
251 See H. Ross, supra note 195, at 233-43; Bombaugh, supra note 196, at
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B. Toward Enterprise Liability: Proposed Steps
If enterprise liability might be preferable to official liability,
how can the transition from individual to institutional liability be
effected? The story of judicial decisions respecting official excuse
from liability presented in part II reflects an expansion of liability
for some officers that may in part have been justified by the absence
of enterprise liability. Yet even as official immunity has been nar-
rowed for these officials, liability for governmental enterprises has
expanded. To a significant extent, sovereign immunity from suit
now has been abrogated at both the federal and state levels
-.25 2
Moreover, municipalities may now be sued directly under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,253 the principal vehicle for damage suits against public
officers. It is not entirely clear what the scope of municipal liability
under section 1983 will be. The Court has declared that cities will
not be vicariously liable for official misconduct not sanctioned by
official policy.2 5 4 At the same time, when conduct is found to have
been sanctioned by officials of sufficient rank to trigger liability, the
municipalities will not benefit from the qualified immunity defense
available to officials. 255 One possible result of these decisions could
be to leave low-level officers liable for their mistakes, subject to the
qualified immunity defense, while making cities absolutely liable
for errors of high-level officers. If the Court adheres to its decision
that the availability of enterprise liability does not abrogate official
liability,256 that would provide plaintiffs the option of pursuing the
officer or the enterprise for misconduct by higher-level officials-the
very ones who are more likely to have relatively balanced incentives
and for whose acts liability thus is less likely to be socially beneficial.
It may be that the difficulty of determining when an official's
improper action will be attributed to the municipality will move
municipal enterprise liability under section 1983 in the direction
252 See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946)
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); S. SATo & A. VN AxLsrvuNE, STATE
LoCAL GOVMWMENT LAw 725, 728 (1977). See also Wolcher, Sovereign
Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own
Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CAuF. L. REV. 189, 239 & n.214 (1981).
2342 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See Monell v. Department of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658 (1978), rev'g in part Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
254Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978).
Nor are municipalities liable for punitive damages in § 1983 suits. City of New-
port v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981).
255 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). Justice Powell in
dissent observed that cities had gone from absolute immunity to absolute lia-
bility in only two years. Id. 664-65 (Powell, J., dissenting).
256 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
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of official liability, and not in the direction of a second remedy for
officials whose nonliability incentives are more closely analogous
to category three than category two. If this route is taken, two
more steps would substantially complete a transition to enterprise
liability: congressional action, under the authority of section five
of the fourteenth amendment,257 to extend section 1983 to suits
directly against the states,258 and construction of section 1983 and
related damage remedies as not authorizing damage actions against
officials when the governmental enterprise is available as a defend-
ant. Each step requires a brief comment.
The extension of section 1983 to suits against a state, absent
the state's consent, presents a conflict with the eleventh amendment.
Although that amendment bars only the exercise of federal judicial
power over suits against a state by citizens of another state or na-
tion,259 the Court long ago construed it also to bar suits in federal
court against a state by one of its own citizens.2 6 0 While the amend-
ment as written would present only a minor impediment to a shift
to enterprise liability, the current judicial interpretation of the
amendment constitutes a serious impediment. To an extent, inno-
vative judicial decisionmaking, finding waivers of sovereign im-
munity in surprising ways,26 1 has reduced the importance of this
judicial gloss. Nonetheless, a reversal of the decisions expanding
the eleventh amendment would be a simple means of resolving
this difficulty. To one who finds the argument for reading the
amendment to mean what it does not say unconvincing, this course
would produce collateral benefits by simplifying the law of federal
jurisdiction.
262
25U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
258A recent effort to reach this result was unsuccessful. See Civil Rights Im-
provement Act of 1979, S. 1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNe. REc. S15,994
(daily ed. Nov. 6, 1979). See generally Field, The Eleventh Amendment and
Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the
States, 126 U. PA. L. LEv. 1203 (1978).
259 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI provides: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
260 See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
261 See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). But see Edel-
man v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
262The case for reversing Hans is made in considerably greater detail in
Engdahl, supra note 29, at 60-67. See also Voleher, supra note 195 (arguing
that eleventh amendment restraints should be avoided by mandating state court
entertainment of claims not cognizable in federal courts).
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The judicial construction of section 1983 noted here as a pos-
sible second step in the transition to enterprise liability, however,
would seem at once a step toward less straightforward interpreta-
tion of that statute. That would not, of course, be the case if
Congress included that interpretation in the text of the statute. Yet,
even if Congress did not go so far, reading section 1983 to preclude
suits against individual officers where the governmental entity is
suable hardly can be thought to do more violence to the text of
section 1983 than the Court has done already. Section 1983 de-
clares that "every person" who, under color of state law, deprives
another person of federally secured protections "shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding." 263 The Court has held that actions at law are, as a
rule, not suitable proceedings when instituted against judges or
legislators 264 and further has suggested that for some acts by these
officials, no other proceeding is proper.265 Moreover, the Court has
interpreted the language of section 1983 to provide for liability of
non-immune officials only if they have acted in bad faith or beyond
the pale of reasonably authorized conduct.266 Finally, as noted
above, the Court has declared the word "person" to include mu-
nicipalities. 67
It quickly should be granted that the statute is not a model
of clarity and its history is a fertile source of argument but not of
elucidation.265 The point is not that the Court has gone astray
in its reading of section 1983, but rather that the interpretation
suggested here, refusing to hold officials personally liable for dam-
263Section 1983 (1976) reads in full:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. §1983 (1976).
264Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-55 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
265Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980);
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
266 E.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
26 7 See note 253 supra.
268 See, e.g., majority and dissenting opinions in Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
[Vol. 129:1110
PUBLIC OFFICERS
ages where the state is available as a defendant, is at least as con-
sistent with the text as is the current construction. The Court
has opted to try to reach sensible results in section 1983 litigation
rather than attempt truly to divine the intent of that statute's
drafters. Any attempt at the latter course is an exercise in frustra-
tion. Even at the most basic level, questions concerning section
1983's meaning and purpose are unclear.26 9 Was the statute in-
tended to provide a federal forum for ordinary state remedies so as
to assure equal protection of the laws to groups that might not re-
ceive evenhanded treatment in state courts? 270 Or was it intended
to provide a federal remedy for which there was no state ana-
logue? 271 Whatever the purpose of section 1983, the Court has
sought to harmonize protection of federal interests (including the
interest against certain state-sanctioned discriminations) with the
states' concerns over effective government. 2 2 By barring actions
against individuals when a state or municipality can be sued, that
task will be better accomplished.273
This interpretation of section 1983 would not bar states from
recovering over against state officers. If states or their subdivisions
believe that this course is a useful supplement to other devices for
constraining employees' behavior, there is little reason for courts
to distrust that judgment. Because the governmental enterprise
must take an affirmative act to reach this result, it should not be
expected generally to err in the direction of passing on too much of
the liability burden to individual officers.
27 4
In addition to providing a better framework for adjudicating
liability for government actions at the state and local levels, this
269 See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond,
60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277, 279-82 (1965); Developments in the Law-Section 1983
and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133, 1141-56 (1977).
270See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 654-56 (1980);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 563-64 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Schnapper,
Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUm. L. REv. 213, 243-44 (1979).
2 7
1 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 237-43 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Newman, supra note 29, at 447-51; Schnapper, supra note 270, at
244-45.
272 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 497, 508-14 (1978); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240-42 (1974).
273 Insofar as it is feared that states might be willing to pay the price of
damage judgments in order to continue popular, if unconstitutional, discrimina-
tions, a fear that seems reasonable in light of states' reactions to desegregation
decisions, it should be noted that both injunctive relief and criminal penalties
would continue to be available tools for combating undesirable behavior by state
officials. See 18 U.S.C. §§241, 242, 245 (1976); 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1976).
2 74 See text accompanying notes 231-37 supra.
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interpretation of section 1983 could be expected to benefit the
federal establishment. Supreme Court decisions respecting liability
of federal officials over the past decade have embodied the view
that, when federal rights are at issue, it is only fitting that enforce-
ment of those rights against the federal government be no less
zealous than enforcement against the states. This view was plainly
expressed in Butz v. Economou 275 to justify substitution of the
qualified immunity test where absolute immunity had theretofore
applied. So too, this view appears in decisions, such as the de-
lightfully titled Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics,270 which infer rights of action against
federal officers directly from the Constitution. In recently holding
that such rights of action can be implied against officers even where
statutory damage remedies against the United States are available,
the Court again was simply paralleling the course of liability for
state officials.27 7  The distinctions between the position-practical
and legal-of state and federal officers may well militate against
this sort of parallelism. But if the Court followed this pattern by
restricting suits against federal officers where alternative remedies
are available, a result parallel to the proposed reading of section
1983, it might increase the likelihood that damage suits would im-
prove rather than diminish those officials' incentives to behave in a
socially desirable manner.
C. Continuing Issues: Lines, Limits and Standards
The proposals discussed in the last section, of course, do not
resolve all issues pertaining to governmental liability. Three re-
maining issues are touched on in this section.
Abrogating official liability in favor of enterprise liability can-
not be accomplished by a simple rule that no government official
is personally liable for any act. Plainly there are some activities,
engaged in by officials, that need no special protection.27  A con-
gressman out shopping one Saturday drives his family car into the
rear of another vehicle. His activity is in no way different from
that of any other driver. There is no reason to believe that the
liability rules constraining other drivers' incentives to behave de-
275 438 U.S. 478, 500-01 (1978).
276 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971). See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979).
277 E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
278 See Epstein, supra note 29, at 57-58.
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sirably and allocating financial responsibility for injury are less
effective for a congressman than for a businessman. The off-duty
policeman who in the course of an argument shoots someone sim-
ilarly merits no special immunity.
In drawing the line between official behavior, which should
be immune from private damage liability, and "personal" behavior
by an official, which should not, the appropriate question is whether
the official was in the situation that generated the challenged action
by virtue of his governmental position. Even where the congress-
man's accident takes place on the way to his office or the police-
man's gun is issued by his department, this question must be
answered in the negative.2 79 The official connection to driving or
to owning and carrying a gun is not significant to these situations.
Once it is acknowledged, however, that the official found himself
in the situation from which his act arose because he was a govern-
ment officer, the degree to which he strayed from the duties of his
office should not be an issue. Stump v. Sparkman was rightly de-
cided on this point, for once the degree of departure from actual
authority becomes an issue in drawing the line between immunity
and liability, immunity effectively is lost, even where liability is
denied.28
0
A second issue that will continue to pose difficulties for courts
relates to limiting the situations in which recovery may be had
against the enterprise given that the individual is immune. There
are some governmental actions for which enterprise liability as
well as official liability is undesirable.281  Should the United States,
for instance, be held answerable in damages to persons injured in a
military invasion if the government was negligent in planning or
implementing the invasion? Should the government be liable if it
270 Two cases presenting similar issues reveal the different judicial resolutions
of such matters. In MeCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419
(1947), the city was held liable when an off-duty policeman shot and killed
another, though the shooting was not in connection with an attempt to halt a
crime or apprehend a suspect. The department's rule that police carry guns off
duty was held to be sufficient involvement by the governmental enterprise. In
Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 601
(1980), the court held that a judge lacked judicial or prosecutorial immunity for
some, but not all, conduct that originated outside the scope of his office. The
judge discovered plaintiff near a building in which the judge had a financial inter-
est, held plaintiff at gunpoint, turned him over to police, secured a business part-
ner's signature on a complaint form, processed the case as though defendant had
pleaded guilty, and entered a conviction and sentence. Liability was found for
the unauthorized prosecution. See also Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3806 (U.S. Apr. 28, 1981) (No. 80-1559).
2 SoStamp v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362-64 (1978).
281 See Baxter, supra note 29, at 51.
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can be shown that the President knew that invasion through another
geographic route would cost fewer lives? There is an intuitive re-
action against liability, indeed against judicial reviewability, where
such decisions are at issue. The distinction between governmental
and proprietary activity, sometimes used to express this thought,
2s2
does not capture the objection to liability for poor wartime plan-
ning. Operation of a police force is a classic governmental activity,
yet enterprise liability for police errors probably will be beneficial
and judicial review of police conduct has rarely been thought inap-
propriate.
At bottom, the distinction is that addressed in part III. For
some official activities, we trust officials to have relatively good, if
still imperfect, incentives to act in a socially desirable fashion,
because people with opposed interests have been about equally
effective in rewarding officials decisions, and because institutional
or other considerations guarantee a serious, as well as balanced,
effort by the official to perform his assigned task. At the same time,
these category three and four activities are most costly to evaluate.
Devices other than liability, thus, seem appropriate guarantors of
socially desirable conduct. More precisely, even though we do not
all agree on what such conduct is and have difficulty assessing
whether it has been achieved, which together make us uneasy over
our ability to secure official action that a consensus would find
optimal, liability for category three and four activities does not
sufficiently improve official incentives to merit its cost. That point
holds whether official or enterprise liability is at issue.283 The dif-
ference is that enterprise liability promises a possible advantage
in adjusting to liability incentives that are too great-because the
activity at issue more appropriately belonged to category three or
four than category two; because the courts failed to take account of
the liability incentive generated by unsuccessful suits, or because,
frequency of suit aside, the expected damage penalty is set too
high.
A related problem to that of ascertaining limits to enterprise
liability is the determination of the appropriate standard for such
liability.284 Should the enterprise be held liable whenever an
official exceeds his authority? Or should there be a range of toler-
282 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 29, at 56-60; Mashaw, supra note 29, at
10-14.
283 See, e.g., Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 57 GEo. L.J. 81, 114-18 (1968).
284 See Epstein, supra note 29, at 52-53.
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able performance errors for which damage penalties should be
denied? These issues are not easily resolved and extended treat-
ment here would considerably enlarge the scope of this undertaking.
The observation relevant to the focus of this article is simply that
a shift from official liability to enterprise liability, while it does not
eliminate these issues, does not make their resolution any more
onerous than at present. The courts' task in addressing enterprise
and official liability alike is to advance officials' incentives at once
to adhere to the statutory and constitutional limitations on their
conduct and to promote public benefits from that conduct. The
burden of the discussion here is not that this task is easily carried
out, but that it might more easily be achieved with enterprise than
with personal damage liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law of official liability fashioned by the Supreme Court,
especially insofar as it removes the bar of absolute immunity to
suits against high-level executive officials and gives all executive
officers a defense of good faith and reasonable cause to believe their
acts lawful, probably provides too much opportunity for adversely
affecting official behavior while only rarely granting damage awards
to plaintiffs. Together with standards for assessing liability and
measuring damages, the decisions respecting the immunity defense
help shape incentives governing official behavior. The expected
damage penalty that emerges from these rules may seem appropri-
ate, but if the effect of litigation that does not result in damage
awards is taken into account, the penalty is likely now to be too
great. This is especially true for officials who exercise authority
directly and visibly against individuals who can institute legal
actions at low cost.
Although these officials often may be ones whose authority we
are anxious to constrain-because it is coercive and has the potential
to impose considerable cost on the individuals subject to it-official
damage liability is a poor device to effect that constraint. Nearly
all government action has a range of effects on a variety of people,
giving individuals strikingly different interests in the way officials
should behave. The very same differences in interests that make
it difficult to define good government behavior and to give officials
at the outset incentives to engage in such behavior-in sum, the
reasons one might want to hold officials liable-make it difficult to
assess when officials should be liable and more difficult yet to assure
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that liability increases the likelihood of good behavior. Given the
difficulty of policing official action, one response to a too high
expected damage penalty will be undesirable official action that
reduces the probability of suit.
A better, if still imperfect, mechanism for securing appropriate
official behavior may be to hold the governmental enterprise, rather
than the individual officer, liable for improper official conduct.
Enterprise liability simultaneously will secure greater opportunity
for compensation of meritorious plaintiffs. The transition to
enterprise liability need not be difficult. Relatively simple steps by
Congress and by the courts could accomplish the task. Even absent
congressional action, the courts could limit some potential ill effects
of current rules by granting officials immunity from personal liabil-
ity where a governmental entity is suable instead. In all events, the
Court would do well to reconsider a series of decisions that appear
to have encouraged a torrent of litigation from which a steady
stream of trials yields but a trickle of recovery.
